will, to ratify that verdict. Not to do so was, as Benton expressed it with a desperate plunge into Greek, “a violation of the demos krateo principle.” This was equivalent to saying that a mere plurality of the electoral vote should be sufficient to elect a President; for if the House of Representatives were in duty bound to ratify that plurality as if it were a majority, then the plurality would practically elect. But the Constitution expressly provides that a President shall not be elected by a plurality of the electoral votes, and that, when no clear majority is obtained, the House of Representatives shall freely choose from those three candidates who shall have received the highest numbers. Moreover, the electors having in six states been appointed by the legislatures, it was a mere matter of conjecture whether General Jackson would have had a plurality of the popular vote, had the electors in all the states been chosen by the people. Finally, there was nothing to prove that Adams would not have been the second choice of the friends of Crawford and Clay, in a sufficient number of cases to insure him a clear majority in an election confined to him and Jackson. The presumption may be said to have been in favor of this, if, as proved to be the fact, the House of Representatives was inclined to give him that majority. There was, therefore, nothing in such an argument to limit the freedom of Clay's choice.
Benton himself admitted that his “demos krateo principle” was in conflict with the theory of
