Ever since the commencement of the campaign it had been known to every diplomatist in the English service, that should the war prove successful, a partition of French territory would take place between the victorious allies. Against such a partition no whisper of disapproval had been heard. It was only when the tide of invasion was rolled back and Belgium was threatened, that English remonstrances arose and the balance of power began to be spoken of.
The closing of the Scheldt was owing to the commercial jealousy of the Dutch, and was a measure so repugnant to common justice, that it is difficult to realise that the minister who made the treaty of 1786, should have seen a serious provocation in the opening by the French of that river to navigation.
That the decree of the 19th November was a gross provocation is undeniable. The terms of it did not however necessarily apply to England, and for this interpretation M. Chauvelin contended. The best reply would have been a contemptuous silence. The danger to Holland seems to have been more felt in England than in Holland itself, and it was at the bidding ot England that Holland was reluctantly dragged into the war. But there were other reasons which ought to have made England hesitate about joining the continental Powers. A second dismemberment of Poland, as Lord Lansdowne repeatedly insisted, was being planned by them at a moment, when the internal condition of that country afforded less justification for interference than at any previous period. The despotic rulers of Russia and Prussia saw a risk of that country obtaining free and settled institutions, and they resolved to crush liberty all over the world at one blow. With these views, they were not averse to gaining the assistance of English gold, in order to equip armies which would be as easily used against Warsaw as against Paris. Such were the considerations which ought to have suggested themselves to the mind of an English minister; but in the turmoil of the political times, Pitt,
