lant’s catalogue. However, a perusal of the record as a whole demonstrates to our complete satisfaction that the court was convinced that there was substantial copying. Therefore, the liability of appellees has been established and the only remaining issue to be tried is that of damages, including the question of the extent of the copying, and whether appellant is entitled to injunctive relief.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings in accordance herewith.
CONTINENTAL CAN COMPANY, Inc., Petitioner,
v.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent.
No. 15223.
United States Court of Appeals
Third Circuit.
Argued Sept. 21, 1965.
Decided Oct. 19, 1965.
W. S. Ryza, Chicago, Ill. (Charles J. Biddle, Drinker, Biddle & Reath, Philadelphia, Pa., James G. Davis, Pope, Ballard, Uriell, Kennedy, Shepard & Fowle, Chicago, Ill., on the brief), for petitioner.
Elliott Moore, Atty., N. L. R. B., Washington, D. C. (Arnold Ordman, Gen. Counsel, Dominick L. Manoli, Associate Gen. Counsel, Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Allen M. Hutter, Atty., N. L. R. B., on the brief), for respondent.
Before McLAUGHLIN, HASTIE and FREEDMAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
This litigation is before us for the second time. In its first appearance here review was sought of the Board’s order dismissing an unfair labor practice complaint based upon the then petitioner’s charges that he and several other employees had been wrongfully discharged by the employer, the present petitioner. After the original hearing, the Trial Examiner concluded that the discharges involved were discriminatorily motivated. Those evidentiary findings were adopted by the Board but the latter concluded that the employees were discharged for fighting. The Board therefore dismissed the complaint of unfair labor practice against the employer. In our opinion, Greco v. N. L. R. B., et als., 331 F.2d 165, 166 (3 Cir. 1964), we found that the Examiner’s findings of fact, adopted by the Board as to the circumstances surrounding the discharges, “* * * are based upon substantial evidence * * *.” We held p. 169 that “In our view, these findings clearly preclude any inference that the employees were discharged for fighting. On the contrary, the mere recitation of them compels only one conclusion, that the discharges were discriminatorily motivated.” We decided that, since the findings of fact adopted by the Board did not support its conclusion that the discharges were not discriminatory, its conclusion could not stand. The cause was remanded to the Board for further proceedings in conformity with our opinion.
