come to a dead lock within twenty-four hours. If he had once formed an opinion on any subject, I doubt if it would be easy for him to renounce or modify it — though those who know his Excellency well say that he is always ready to do so whenever new facts relating to the matter come before him: but this rather supports my view; because in most great questions the difficulty is not so much to get at the facts as to perceive their relationships, and to take these latter into one comprehensive judicial view. The amount of business which he goes through is remarkable; and more than Lord Amherst was, he is entitled to say, with some surprise, "The emperor of China and I govern half the human race, and yet we find time to breakfast;" for he is exceedingly regardful of the courtesies, and of even something more than the courtesies, of his trying and responsible position. We do not hear so much of Lord Northbrook's feats on horseback as we did of those of his predecessor; but they are not less remarkable. It is only about fifty-two miles from Simla to Kotgarh; but the nature of the bridle-road is such, and it runs along the top of so many precipices, that it is rather a feat to ride over it in less than a day; and I have also heard of his lordship riding from Chini to Narkunda in a dangerously short period. I may also note the viceroy's habit of walking about unguarded, accompanied by a single friend; and have heard of his being seen alone with his son, or some other youth, after dark, close to the Ganges, near Barrackpore. This may be thought unwise courage: but, though undoubtedly courage, I am not sure that it is unwise; for really life is not worth having on the condition of its being constantly guarded. The class of men who violently assassinate in India admire this kind of courage so much that they will not readily strike at it; and most cases of assassination which occur in that country have been committed in spite of the close protection of guards. It is doubtful, however, if it be wise to have Simla so unprotected as it appears to be. I do not remember seeing a single European soldier there, unless the governor-general's band be accounted as such. The only representatives of law and order visible were two European police-officers, a few native policemen, and the governor-general's native body-guard. It would not have been difficult to have extinguished the whole government of India in one night; and a danger of that sort, however remote and unlikely, ought to be guarded against. Nothing in India was held to be more unlikely than the Mutiny — until it occurred, and even after it had commenced.
At the close of this Parliament her Majesty has acknowledged the great services of Lord Northbrook, in connection with the Bengal famine, in a manner which could scarcely have come from a ministry opposed to that which appointed him, unless his "strenuous exertions" had really merited very "high approbation." It is now seen by the public generally that he has met the great and disturbing disaster of the famine in a masterly manner. When he was exerting himself to the utmost, it was inexpedient for the viceroy to speak of the measures he was taking to meet the coming calamity, and advantage was taken of his mouth being sealed, and of his having wisely refused to prohibit the export of rice, to criticise and assail him. Whether intentionally or not, an impression was created that the viceroy did not see the magnitude of the danger, and would not of himself take energetic and sufficient steps to meet it. Highly sensational telegrams and articles to this effect appeared in rapid succession; and it was left out of mind, that on the very first report of danger, Lord Northbrook hurried down from Simla to Calcutta before the conclusion of the unhealthiest month of the year, and at once brought all his great energy to bear on the subject of the famine. He could not proclaim from the housetops any intention of buying up millions on millions of tons of rice, and, if necessary, of feeding two and a half millions of people for an indefinite period; because, to have done so would have vastly increased the difficulty by making the bunnias throughout India buy and store up rice right and left, and by creating a great movement into the famine-districts of people desirous of participating in the bounty of government. Also, as the event has shown, while making perfectly sufficient arrangements to meet the coming famine, the viceroy refused, on sound economic grounds, to interfere with and check private trade by prohibiting the export of rice from Bengal; and this was immediately seized upon as a proof that he did not understand the magnitude of the coming crisis, and that he required to be instructed, warned, and brought up to a sense of duty by his benevolent and
