have to contend; her statesmen are so fully aware of the internal difficulties that would arise upon the rear of her armies if a single-handed contest with Germany were forced upon her; her whole political administration is not merely severed into two co-equal jealous parts by that dual system which is the charter of her modern life, but so complex, slow and feeble as compared to that of the German empire; that these facts alone, which are too patent to be ignored at home or abroad, would be sufficient guarantees for her quietude if not absolutely attacked by her formidable neighbour. Above all, eight millions of her motley population, the most intelligent, active, and wealthy of the races that make up Austro-Hungary, would give their sympathies wholly to her foe, if Vienna broke with Berlin to-morrow. Most real would be Austria's danger then, with her Teutonic population absolutely hostile, her Czechs coldly disposed towards the centralizing monarchy, and the Serbs and Croats ready to turn at any time against an administration which is in their eyes the instrument of the oppression of their own races by the Magyar. In fact such a war would be dangerous in any case to the house of Hapsburg, and defeat would seriously imperil its crown. But all this is on the supposition that Austria has or soon will have equal military means to those of Germany for such a conflict. This, however, is very far from being the case, as a brief comparison will show. Of the year's class of young men available for the conscription, which is within a few thousands of the number reckoned on in Germany, she allots to regular training for the three years' service but 95,000, whilst Germany sets apart, including substitutes for possible absentees, 130,000. It follows that those fully qualified and yet passed over in Austria, although enrolled ostensibly in the Landwehr, rather weaken than reinforce that arm of the service; at least according to the modern view of military organization, which makes the militiaman date his efficiency only from the completion of his service in the line. In men, at any rate, it is clear that Austria can as little hope to rival Germany numerically, as to match her inferior races with the hardy peasants of Pomerania and Brandenburg. But men, as all the world has lately learnt by patent examples, do not decide a great war speedily unless sent into the field well organized, and found in every necessary. To prepare and maintain the equipments required for war during years of peace is a duty entailing much of the regular annual military expenditure of great nations: and hence their average outlay, taking prices as nearly equal, affords a rough test of their desire to be ready for the least emergency. Now in proportion to her income, Austria is at present by far the most economical of the great powers of the Continent. For whilst Germany is spending twenty-six per cent of the national receipts on her armaments, France thirty, and Russia no less than thirty-six per cent, Austria is content with an outlay of less than twenty per cent. And this at a time when Germany is known to have relieved her own exchequer of all the direct expenses of fortifications, military railroads, and re-armaments by the use of the French indemnity.
There could be no more patent proof than this hard pecuniary fact, that Austria does not intend to maintain the race for power with her ancient rival by force of arms. She is weaker now, she admits; and each year that sees her numbers of reserve men so much less than those of Germany, and her military administration so much cheaper, must evidently put it more and more out of her power to engage her neighbour on equal terms. Austrians know this, and naturally chafe at it. Indeed, the very figures we are following are taken from an Austrian authority. But what they know and feel so keenly is of course not less known at Berlin. And it follows that it cannot be Austria which is the object of secret national dread in Germany; unless, indeed, her power be viewed as subsidiary to some more dangerous adversary. But this is not to be sought in France at present. An alliance between these two unaided from elsewhere could hardly have terrors just yet for the great power that has humbled each successively; even did their natural antagonism of sentiment and interests allow them to prepare secretly for a common revenge, which the common foe would assuredly anticipate by striking before either was ready.
Hitherto we have been but clearing the ground. It has been our object to show that there is but one power left in Europe which Germany has any cause to fear; that formidable Muscovite empire, in attempting to subdue which at the height of his power, Napoleon spent all his strength in vain, and prepared his own ruin in the strain of the effort. Of course it is easy to protest roundly that Germany may be trusted not to repeat his crimes or his errors. History, however, cannot be fore-
