forces; but they would be quite as useful if left open as though girt with impregnable works. Fortresses, like other strictly defensive means for war, are intended to aid the weaker party, not that which is unquestionably the stronger. And the true use of this mighty barrier can evidently only be found if Germany be unexpectedly called for the time to act strictly on the defensive against a French invasion. But such an invasion could only be hopefully made, such a defensive attitude only be adopted, if the striking-power of Germany be for the time summoned away to meet a great danger elsewhere. This danger lies in the possible simultaneous assault from the east by Russia, whilst France does her share on the Rhine; and it is to ward off such a double attack that the military policy of Berlin is directed. It would be more convenient, much cheaper, and would incur far less material risk to settle conclusively with France now, and so thoroughly reduce her power that Russia could no longer count on her for serious aid. But the instinct of the czar and his people, we may add too the whole sentiment of Europe, were promptly exercised last May, to hinder an act of policy, which, however its true scope and intent was concealed, could only have been carried out by such a stretch of ruthless injustice and violence as would have matched the most violent deeds of Napoleon in the summit of his power. Almost at the last moment those who had counselled the deed seemed to recoil from its execution. The fate of Europe was for the time in the balance, just as in old days when the ambitious Corsican was meditating the ruin of some already weakened neighbour. But Prince Bismarck, happily for the world, though so far yielding to his country's weaknesses as to wear the uniform of a major-general of militia, is at heart never easy when military advisers are most listened to; and there can be little doubt that his voice was finally given in favour of the peace which the czar crossed Europe to insist on. So the danger to France was averted for the while. But this tranquillity allowed her, is of itself no doubt assigned as cause more pressing for urging on to completion the barrier against which her army, even were the field elsewhere open, might spend its strength in vain. Regarded thus, as directed against a double foe — the one enemy to be crushed by active operations, whilst the other is held in check by fortresses and such troops of the second line as the new Landsturm — the military policy of Berlin, which pays such devoted attention to the western frontier of the empire, whilst the eastern is left, as it were, open between Warsaw and Berlin, is simple, explicable, and just. As against France alone, or Russia alone, such care mixed with such seeming carelessness would be worthy of the most shortsighted instead of the profoundest of administrations.
That the double contest thus prepared for will ever come in our day, or what its issue should it come, are questions no prudent man would pretend to give absolute answers to. To forecast the future of politics is notoriously impossible, of war between untried antagonists very difficult. All that it is safe to assert is that, unless thoroughly reformed, as well as largely augmented, the Russian army would be shattered by the Germans: and that the French, however well reorganized, should accomplish the march to Berlin, which would naturally be attempted, could only be possible after long delay before the frontier fortresses, or by passing between them at so great an apparent risk as, strategically speaking, would require the highest military genius to conceive and carry out the plan with any hope of success. The works that are to protect Germany will be completed and armed, and the reserves to fill and cover them be organized, long before the Russian scheme of future military grandeur, and the French dreams of vengeance through reorganization, are carried into practical effect. And then, when each of these three powers has done all it would desire to do, the probabilities of success seem still to lie on the side of the empire which is central in situation, united in heart, and coolly and skilfully prepared for the event. Were we compelled to prophesy, we should not hesitate to say that Germany's chances, viewed thus distantly, seem to weigh down those of her supposed adversaries, who could not possibly rely on the union and promptitude of action with which they would certainly be met.
There is one important contingency remaining to be noticed. We have said nothing in all this of Austria and her slow yet heavy sword. She would probably occupy both in politics, and in the strictly military features of the situation, an attitude marvellously like that she assumed when France, under Napoleon, sixty years since, recovering for the moment from the Moscow disaster, attacked Prussia and Russia united. Once more her army, too serious an instrument to be overlooked, would be gathered — as in 1813, or again in
