whatever may be said now to the contrary, entertained substantially the same views before the war; the immense majority was convinced that France was irresistible. The opposition deputies went farther than any one in that belief; for they persistently asserted in the Chamber that no regular army was required at all, and that, "with liberty and a National Guard," France would be a match for all possible enemies. The government profited so eagerly by every possible opportunity to assure the nation of its strength, that it is worth while to give a few examples of the sort of talking it indulged in. Maréchal Randon, then minister of war, said, in April 1867: "What! a nation like France, which, in a few weeks, can assemble 600,000 soldiers round its flags, which has 8,000 field-pieces in its arsenals, 1,800,000 muskets, and powder enough to make war for six years, — that nation is not always ready to sustain by arms its honour and its right? The army is not ready to commence a campaign when it counts in its ranks the veterans of Africa, of Sebastopol, of Solferino? — when it has to lead it these experienced generals and this crowd of young officers, prepared by the expeditions of Algeria and Mexico to exercise higher commands? What army is there in Europe which possesses such elements of experience and energy? Our infantry is not yet entirely armed with the needle-gun; but has the forward march of our voltigeurs ever been stopped, in our old wars, by the Tyrolese sharpshooters, armed with their rifled carbines, or by the English riflemen? Oh! then let us recall the military virtues of our fathers: they are worth more than needle-guns!"
And this was proclaimed by a marshal of France in the year after Sadowa!
On the 18th of January 1869, the emperor said to the Chambers: "Our improved armament; our arsenals and our magazines all full; our reserves well exercised; the Garde Mobile now forming; ... our fortresses in perfect condition, — give our power an indispensable development ... The military resources of France are henceforth suited to her destiny in the world."
On the 20th of March 1869, Maréchal Niel said, in a speech to the Corps Législatif: —
"The soldiers of the Garde Mobile are all inscribed in the control lists, and are organized in territorial circumscriptions, by companies and battalions. We are organizing the officers. If danger came, and a rapid result were necessary, we are in a position to attain it. We have an excellent army, well instructed, full of ardour, perfectly organized, and provided with everything. ... I do not know what is generally felt in France, but, for my part, I regard with much philosophy the questions of war or peace which are being discussed around us, and, if war were necessary, we are perfectly ready for it."
And on 12th April of the same year he said: —
"Whether it be peace or war is absolutely the same to the minister of war. He is always ready. I will not repeat what I have said several times already, but the army can be put on a war footing in a week. I have nothing but an order to give."
On the 16th August 1869, the Moniteur published the following note: —
"An army of 750,000 men disposable for war; nearly 600,000 men of the Garde Mobile; instruction everywhere pushed on to a degree hitherto unknown; 1,200,000 muskets manufactured in eighteen months; the fortresses ready; an immense matériel prepared for every eventuality, of every kind,—in such a situation France stands confident in her force. All these vast results have been attained in two years!"
Such was the language held by the emperor, by his war-ministers, and by his government. The nation believed every word of it, not so much because the government said it — that, perhaps, was rather a reason for doubting — but because those wordy boastings about military power were exactly what it liked and wanted; because they fitted in exactly with its temperament and its wishes; because, in fact, it would have been indignant if such speeches had not been made. It imperatively required declarations of this sort from its government, and its government was weak enough to give them.
Since 1870 a great wake-up has taken place; but still France longs for the same official assurances that she is great and powerful. There is no sign yet that the old spirit has been driven out, either amongst the people or at the ministry of war; on the contrary, there is too much reason to believe that it continues to exist in both directions, in little-weakened strength. The events of 1870 supply a starting-point from which progress can be measured; that progress has commenced; in some respects it is both real and serious, in others it is scarcely perceptible: but though it will be recognized,
