pretend to be beyond the political horizon. Dutchmen themselves are certainly not such optimists as to ignore the subject, nor so unpatriotic as to sit still after it has been brought home to them, in hopes that those vague influences of wealth and trade which have of late proved ineffectual to preserve peace, may suffice to avert the day of peril. An elaborate and well-weighed scheme, the cost of which was originally estimated at somewhat less than two millions, but afterwards increased to three, was fully sanctioned by the legislature last year for the purposes of defence; and experts declare that this sum must be doubled if the works are to be thoroughly executed as designed, and the army completely reorganized within the eight years fixed by the law. Readers who have followed us thus far will have no difficulty in comprehending the brief outline of its purpose here offered.
The line of the Yssel, once thought so formidable, has been condemned for permanent occupation, chiefly because the volume of that stream is at certain times so small that it becomes easily fordable at many points, and there are no features along it which are specially suitable for defence. This being so, it is not thought worth while to erect regular forts on this advanced line. Certain strong points only are to he partially intrenched, so as to give a defending army the choice of occupying it if the weather and other conditions made this suitable, as well as of abandoning it at discretion without the appearance or indeed the reality of serious loss. Very similar has been the decision of the Dutch government as regards the next line westward, that of the Grebbe and Ehm; though, as stated to us, it is here arrived at on somewhat different grounds. The Vale of Gelderland, across which this runs, is to this day a difficult and only partially cultivated country, with a good deal of wooded high ground on the eastern or further side of the stream. If the Dutch army is at all able to face its enemy in the open field, somewhere here would be the proper position to take up for the purpose of fighting an action. To restore the old continuous lines which ran along the streams, and which still exist, though in a ruinous condition, would be a work of vast expense if carried out in conformity with the demands of modern defensive science. It is thought better, therefore, to spend the national grant in thoroughly strengthening the heart of the country, which is of course, as of old, the old state of Holland and especially the district near Amsterdam, than to throw away a large sum on a line so far advanced, and so extended, that if held merely on the defensive it might be dangerously pierced through at some single point. The Dutch general would therefore be left, if he found himself unable to hold Gelderland by open force, to retire on his real line of defence behind. And this is to be no other than the line through Utrecht already described, called strangely enough, in the government scheme, the "New Water Line." Here every preparation is to be made that care and experience can suggest for laying the whole belt of country along the Vecht and Vaart at need under a wide sheet of water, shallow indeed, but with deep cuts carefully drawn across it making it impassable except at a few fixed points. These openings are to be strongly protected by works. Naarden, with Weesp, and the other old fortress of Muiden that forms with these a triangle covering the mouth of the Vecht, are to be thoroughly reconstructed on modern principles. Breeswyk, and other points likely to be attempted, will be guarded by large other roomy forts armed with plenty of short-ranging but powerful rifled guns, and well provided with bomb-proof cover for troops. Utrecht is to be itself surrounded to the east by a chain of the same defences. And a separate second or inner line of detached forts will protect the westernmost parts of the inundation, being so disposed that no surprise of any single passage will allow a hostile army to get through. All important landing-places on the coast behind, where an enemy might endeavour to debark a force sufficient to turn these front lines, such as the Helder, and the mouth of the Meuse, are to be separately fortified on the ordinary principles. Finally, and as a last resort, Amsterdam will be treated, as in days of old, as the citadel of the whole; only the new works for its special protection will be advanced so far as to save the city from the terrors of bombardment for even long-ranging guns and will be supported on the side the Zuyder-Zee by a strong squadron of monitors and floating batteries built especially for this purpose.
The arrangements thus sanctioned are, of course, as well known, and perhaps nearly as closely studied, in Germany as in Holland. Indeed our information respecting them is drawn mainly from German sources. It is perfectly understood on both sides that the chief object of the Dutch in making these sacrifices is to protect their independence against the gigan-
