concentration be completed in nineteen days as it was by the Germans in 1870 — or in fifteen days, as it is believed that they could do now? Perhaps not. It is prudent to admit at once — but without attempting to be precise — that France would be slower than Germany. Yet notwithstanding the possible and even very probable causes of delay which have been set forth here, there is no just reason for supposing that the difference would be considerable. It could hardly exceed three or four days. This opinion is based upon a calculation which can easily be verified. In 1870, according to the official reports, the order of mobilization was sent out on 14th July; it was calculated that the arrival of the men at their regiments would be terminated on the 31st — not including the concentration into corps d'armée and armies, which was to be effected afterwards. Now, however, according to the actual plan of keeping the infantry reservists in the same regions as their regiments, a notice issued on the 14th could order the reservists to be at their depots on the evening of the 17th. The 18th would be passed in equipping them. They could start the same night for their regiments (which in most cases would not be very far off), and on the morning of the 19th each company could be on its war footing. Counting, however, another forty-eight hours, to compensate for the possible delays which have been enumerated, it follows that it is now possible to do in seven days the same work that took seventeen days in 1870. It is true that, as regards the special arms, whose reservists would have greater distances to travel, the time might be a little longer; but, allowing largely for that contingency, there seems to be no fair ground for doubting that the mobilization (properly so called) could be finished in a time which could scarcely exceed twelve days in all.
The concentration of the regiments into brigades, divisions, and corps d'armée, and of the corps d'armée into armies, could probably be effected in ten days more, for everything is ready.
It may therefore be asserted — so far, at least, as apparent probabilities can guide us — that the entire process might be completed in a time which would range between eighteen and twenty-two days.
And even if France were a little longer over it than Germany would be, no perceptible disadvantage to her could result from the delay; for, as it is morally certain (as will be shown presently) that France cannot attack Germany, and that, if another war takes place, the attack must be made by Germany, it follows that the invader would have to travel a greater distance to the fighting ground than the defender would have to cover, and would therefore lose in distance what he might gain in time. Consequently, as regards speed, the two sides would probably find themselves on a footing of virtual equality.
Well, we will now suppose the concentration to be completed, conformably to the exigencies of the situation as it may present itself at the time. The troops have formed up into three or four fighting armies, and have drafted off the frameworks of the garrisons of the great intrenched camps, and of the forces destined to guard Paris and Lyons. In estimating that six corps d'armée would be required for these latter purposes, and that the other elements of the garrisons would be supplied by the reserves and the territorial army, we shall not, probably, be very wide of the truth; if so, thirteen corps d'armée, out of the total of nineteen (the nineteenth having of course been brought over from Algeria, where it is habitually stationed), would be disposable for action in the field. It has been shown that each corps d'armée would number about 35,000 men, so that on this calculation the army on the frontier would amount to 455,000 men — a figure which would most cerrainly be amply sufficient to begin with. It would be backed up by the rest of the 1,300,000 men of the active army — that is to say, by 210,000 in the intrenched camps, by an unconcentrated second line of 325,000, and by an unutilized depot reserve of 310,000 more.
And it must be borne in mind, that if instead of leaving the 144 fourth battalions unconcentrated, they were at once developed into regiments, a large part of the unincorporated reservists could be immediately thrown into them, and a second series of complete armies, amounting, with cavalry and artillery, to at least 350,000 men, could be got together. Plenty of non-commissioned officers could be found amongst the one-year volunteers who would have rejoined. Forty-five thousand of those young gentlemen have now passed through the army; and though the institution which has produced them is most objectionable, and is on the point of being abandoned, they would, at all events, serve a useful purpose in this case. The front army would of course require part of them to keep up its supply of sous-officiers, but eight or ten thousand of them could easily be spared to start the extra compa-
