placed by the minister in more immediate command of the wooden or reserve squadron, Vacca was to command the van or right wing, and Ribotty, the captain of the "Re di Portogallo," to command the rear or left wing, according as the fleet was in line ahead or abreast. But nothing more. Vacca's words, as afterwards given in evidence before the court, are: "No council was called, nor was the plan of battle discussed, as the regulations direct. I was unable to form any idea of what the commander-in-chief meant to do."
To interpret the thought of another man is difficult. In this case I do not believe that there was a thought to interpret. Persano had formed no plan. He had either not permitted himself to think of the possibility of Tegetthoff's approach; or he had trusted to that inborn genius which I often hear spoken of. When the hour of trial came, the admiral was more utterly unprepared than any of his subordinates. Tegetthoff was advancing from about northwest. The Italian ironclad squadron, or so much of it as was available, was hastily formed in line abreast, and steered towards him. But the "Terribile" and "Varese" were at the other end of the island, some ten or twelve miles off; and the "Formi-dabile" was so shattered that she made the signal for permission to part company, and lay to, repairing damages. Her captain, Saint-Bon — who had joined only just as she left Ancona, and did not know his officers even by name — afterwards deposed that her ports were so low, so near the water, that it was impossible for him to prepare for action in such a swell as was then on; so many of his port-lids had been shot away that he must have been swamped. He hoped to have rejoined the fleet within a few hours; but, contrary to all expectation, the fight was over before he was ready.
After standing towards the enemy for a short half-hour, some hazy recollection of last century's wars seems to have flitted across Persano's mind: he made the signal to form line of battle towards the northeast, that is, nearly at right angles to the course on which the Austrians were advancing. He expected — or at least said so afterwards — that Albini, with the wooden frigates, would form a second line on his starboard, or right-hand side, leaving the picking up of the boats and soldiers to the small craft. But Albini had no orders, and, failing these, fell back on a sort of general understanding that wooden ships were not needlessly to engage ironclads. He accordingly stayed well to the rear, and, as far as the fight which followed was concerned, might as well — or better — have been at Ancona.
And meantime Tegetthoff was advancing at full speed; his seven ironclad ships, in a double oblique line, in front, the "Erzherzog Ferdinand Maximilian" leading, the salient point of this wedge of war. Behind, at a distance of one thousand yards, were the seven wooden ships, in a similar formation, the "Kaiser" leading in the wake of the "Ferdinand Max," the fifty-gun frigates "Novara" and "Schwarzenberg" covering the right and left wings; and another thousand yards farther astern were the gun-vessels also in double dchelon; behind all, the despatch vessels and miscellaneous small craft. But Tegetthoff's plans had been arranged long beforehand, and as he advanced the only signals he had to make were: "Clear for action — close up — full speed;" and lastly, at ioh. 35m., "Ironclads to rush against the enemy and sink him."[1]
The charge of the Austrian squadron must be described as brilliant; it was made in good order and with an admirable unanimity and steadiness; but the speed of it has, nevertheless, been very incorrectly stated. It seems quite certain that none of the ships in the Austrian fleet could steam at a rate exceeding ten knots, if so much. I believe that the speed of the charge was not more than eight knots; but probably enough it seemed more, and especially to the thunderstruck Italians.
And now, as the crash was imminent, Persano carried out the idea of changing his ship. His flag was flying at the main of the "Rè d'Italia." He signalled the "Affondatore" to close. The "Re d' Italia" was stopped for quite ten minutes; and the admiral, with his personal staff, but leaving behind his guest and adulator Boggio, went on board the turret-ship. The two or three ships immediately astern, which, owing to the unexpected stoppage of the "Re d' Italia," had probably ranged up abreast of her, saw what was going on; but no one else did. The van had held on its course, and, at a distance of nearly a mile, only saw that a boat passed; and since the ships were all dressed with flags, an ensign at every mast-head and. everywhere else where an ensign could be hoisted, the admiral's flag — which differs but little from an ensign — could not be distinguished. In their subsequent examination, Vacca and Al-
- ↑ The wording of this signal, which may be considered as Tegetthoff s tactical legacy, was, "Panzerschiffe den Feind anrennen und zum sinken bringen."
