The court, which on the 29th of January, 1867, acquitted the admiral on the more serious charges of cowardice and treason, on the 15th of April found him guilty of negligence and incapacity (negligenza e imperizia). On the 27th of June he had manifestly disobeyed his instructions, which were to clear the Adriatic of enemy's ships; on the cruise from the 8th to the 13th of July he had equally violated his instructions by not seeking an opportunity to attack the enemy, or to blockade him in his harbors; and finally at Lissa he had let himself be surprised by the enemy, he had made no disposition for battle, had called no council of war, had gone without general intimation on board the "Affon-datore," had permitted the enemy to break his line, had managed the "Affondatore" badly, and had left the battle to itself; and the court therefore sentenced him to be deprived of his rank as admiral, to be dismissed the service, and to pay the costs of the trial.
There has been in England a tendency to believe that Persano was a victim, sacrificed to the Italian's wounded self love; for myself, after a careful study of the minutes of the trial, I would accept the decision as just, and even lenient. It is, of course, impossible to offer at length the grounds for this opinion; they fill a closely printed quarto of nearly three hundred pages. But in a few words, nothing would more strongly support it than the opening sentences of Persano's own address in reply to the charge. He might almost have been condemned out of his own mouth.
- I cannot understand [he began] how I should be accused of having failed in my duty against the enemy's fleet, which came upon us almost before it was signalled, and whilst we were in considerable embarrassment from the fact that our ships had lately come in from a long voyage and were short of stores.
He then enumerated a number of defects, some of which had been repaired a month before, and went on: —
- So that of the eleven ironclads there were not more than four fit for a long chase. The other seven were, at best, only fit to take part in a battle, but could not be relied on for a chase; and the more so as most of them wanted the guns and ammunition necessary for fighting with ironclads.
- If Tegetthoff had come really with a wish to fight, he would not have withdrawn as soon as we were ready to meet and attack him. I could not, of course, suppose that he had come merely to go away again; and it was therefore my duty, in the first place, to form the fleet so as not to expose it to needless risk; and then to oppose and attack the enemy. But instead of that, he went off after a short time, two or three hours perhaps, much to our regret, and notwithstanding the dashing conduct of our ships' companies.
Of which, a great part is not true; a great part is irrelevant; a great part is self-condemnatory; and all is extremely silly. It is impossible to think or speak with respect of a man who at such a critical period, when honor, perhaps life, was at stake, could give voice to such imbecile maunderings; and so, in the words of the old sagas, he is now out of the story.
Tegetthoff's reception from his country was, as might be expected, very different. It is believed that the result of the battle had a very distinct influence on the terms of the peace which was concluded shortly afterwards, and was the direct means of preserving to Austria the Dalmatian and Illyrian provinces. It may well be that this was so; undoubtedly, had Lissa fallen, Austria would have stood in a very different position with regard to the Adriatic. But coming in a time of great depression and calamity, the moral effect of the victory was greater than any mere material advantage, and the nation and the government hastened to show honor to their champion. The news was sent to Vienna by telegraph; and by telegraph on the very next day Tegetthoff received a message from the emperor promoting him to be a vice-admiral. Decorations were showered on him; but perhaps of all these, the one most grateful to him was that sent by the emperor of Mexico in an autograph letter, dated Chapultepec, August 24, 1866, which ran thus: —
- My dear Rear-Admiral Baron von Tegetthoff, — The glorious victory which you have gained over a brave enemy, vastly superior in numbers and nurtured in grand old naval traditions, has filled my heart with unmixed joy. When I handed over to others the care of the navy which had become so dear to me, and relinquished the task of making the land of my birth great and mighty by sea, amid the clash of contending nations,
accompanies it. The account given in the Archiv für Seewesen for 1866 must also be considered semi-official; but is much shorter, and, by so much, less perfect. There are, of course, many other Austrian and Italian accounts. Persano's own version of the story is "L' Ammiraglio C. di Persano nella campagna navala dell' anno 1866. Confutazioni, schiarimenti e documenti" (Torino, 1873). The French accounts, as given in the Revue Maritime, vols. xviii. and xix., may also be referred to; and the very interesting narrative that appeared in the Revue des Deux Mondes (Nov. 15, 1866), and which, rightly or wrongly, has always been attributed to the Prince de Joinville.
