German prince in Holland the independence of Belgium would be in perpetual peril. Finally, the interest of Great Britain in the matter hardly needs discussion. With a first-class power at Flushing, the English would, at all events, think themselves menaced; and a wave of apprehension rising rapidly into anger would undoubtedly pass over the land. The fact that England faced Cherbourg for ages without any loss of equanimity would be lost sight of in the fear that the new German ports might be so many additional dangers, and in the dread inspired by the perfect organization of the German army. There would be risk of a great European war; and in the presence of such a calamity France might come to an agreement which would leave no little States extant in western Europe. The Continent, for English purposes, would consist only of great powers, while a new and very terrible power would be firmly established in Asiatic waters.
We do not think any such situation fairly probable. In the first place, the house of Orange is not extinct yet, and, in spite of Dutch apprehensions it may never be; and while it lasts Holland is fairly safe. Her people will not enter the empire voluntarily, and Germany would not commence a war of pure aggression. The people do not want the consequent suffering, and the princes do not want the "solidification" which might follow a successful campaign. In the second place, there is no clear evidence that even if the failure of the Netherlands dynasty gave them a pretext for interference, or negotiations about Luxemburg roused popular passion, either the German chancellor or the German people desire to conquer Holland. They have not, since the peace oi 1870, betrayed aggressive tendencies. They have eaten neither German Austria nor German Russia, but have endeavored, with apparent sincerity, to keep the peace. They would hardly care to trust their fleet to a disaffected population, or to add to their troubles a people who for years, possibly for centuries, would consider their independence violently brought to an end. The desire for colonies, though undoubtedly strong with a section of the German people, is believed not to be shared by their statesmen, who are very well aware that dependencies are seldom profitable, and are most averse to increasing the permanent and unavoidable calls upon the treasury and the army. It has been the policy of the Hohenzollerns to avoid such complications, and to seek trade outlets rather in eastern Europe than in Asiatic possessions. When the French army was going to Mexico, Prussia might have seized any South American territory she liked. Prince Bismarck's profound content with M. Ferry's conquests shows that he does not measure national strength by "colonies;" and he knows that liability to foreign service is a terrible strain both upon the willingness and the discipline of a conscript army. The French organization breaks down under it; and M. Ferry is already trying the system which we were obliged to abandon, that of forming a separate army for Asiatic and African service. Prince Bismarck does not desire a war with France, with Russia looking on; while a compromise with France must involve the sacrifice of Belgium, and would secure a great addition alike to her population and her wealth. Statesmen think of the future, and Prince Bismarck would not look forward the more happily because France had a new and potent reason for desiring possession of the Rhine. Nations live a long while; and Germany, with Holland within her boundaries sullen and dissatisfied, and France looking steadily across the Rhine, would not be so independent of external influences, or so fearless of the rise of a military genius outside her borders, as she is now. She would be even more dependent upon the friendship of Austria, and her security requires that Austria should rather depend on her.
Still we do not wonder that the situation in Holland creates some secret anxiety among politicians. It is a most unfortunate thing for a country not ready to declare itself a republic that its dynasty should come to an end; more unfortunate still when that dynasty reigns not by prescription, but in virtue of treaties not a century old; most unfortunate of all when the country is too weak to be independent of foreign influence. If the princess Victoria had died, and Germany had been able to declare for the Duke of Cumberland, and France had supported the Duke of Cambridge, we should have had trouble here; and the position of Holland might conceivably be far worse than that. We could in the last resort have declared a republic, and defied invasion; but that is precisely what Holland cannot do. She could cut the dykes, but without great allies she would be powerless; and what allies could she hope for who would attack Germany, Austria, and France in combination? The possible alarms Con-
