Page:Logic of Chance (1888).djvu/22

§ 5.	Probability only concerned with part of this enquiry.
6.	Difficulty of measuring our belief;
7.	Owing to intrusion of emotions,
8.	And complexity of the evidence.
9.	And when measured, is it always correct?
10, 11.	Distinction between logical and psychological views.
12—16.	Analogy of Formal Logic fails to show that we can thus detach and measure our belief.
17.	Apparent evidence of popular language to the contrary.
18.	How is full belief justified in inductive enquiry?
19—23.	Attempt to show how partial belief may be similarly justified.
24—28.	Extension of this explanation to cases which cannot be repeated in experience.
29.	Can other emotions besides belief be thus measured?
30.	Errors thus arising in connection with the Petersburg Problem.
31. 32.	The emotion of surprise is a partial exception.
33, 34.	Objective and subjective phraseology.
35.	The definition of probability,
36.	Introduces the notion of a 'limit',
37.	And implies, vaguely, some degree of belief.
CHAPTER VII.
THE RULES OF INFERENCE IN PROBABILITY.
§ 1.	Nature of these inferences.
2.	Inferences by addition and subtraction.
3.	Inferences by multiplication and division.
4—6.	Rule for independent events.
7.	Other rules sometimes introduced.
8.	All the above rules may be interpreted subjectively, i.e. in terms of belief.
9—11.	Rules of so-called Inverse Probability.
12, 13.	Nature of the assumption involved in them:
14—16.	Arbitrary character of this assumption.
17, 18.	Physical illustrations.