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Contents.
xxv
§5. | Other attempts at explaining the difficulty. | |
6—8. | What is really meant by the distinction. | |
9. | Origin of the common mistake. | |
10—12. | Examples in illustration of this view, | |
13. | Is Probability relative? | |
14. | What is really meant by this expression. | |
15. | Objections to terming Probability relative. | |
16, 17. | In suitable examples the difficulty scarcely presents itself. | |
CHAPTER XIII. | ||
ON MODALITY. | ||
§ 1. | Various senses of Modality; | |
2. | Having mostly some relation to Probability. | |
3. | Modality must be recognized. | |
4. | Sometimes relegated to the predicate, | |
5, 6. | Sometimes incorrectly rejected altogether. | |
7, 8. | Common practical recognition of it. | |
9—11. | Modal propositions in Logic and in Probability. | |
12. | Aristotelian view of the Modals; | |
13, 14. | Founded on extinct philosophical views; | |
15. | But long and widely maintained. | |
16. | Kant's general view. | |
17—19. | The number of modal divisions admitted by various logicians. | |
20. | Influence of the theory of Probability. | |
21, 22. | Modal syllogisms. | |
23. | Popular modal phraseology. | |
24—26. | Probable and Dialectic syllogisms. | |
27, 28. | Modal difficulties occur in Jurisprudence. | |
29, 30. | Proposed standards of legal certainty. | |
31. | Rejected formally in English Law, but possibly recognized practically. | |
32. | How, if so, it might be determined. | |