the case of the extreme values, will become obvious on
a little consideration. In some of the classes of things to
which the law is supposed to apply, for example, the successions of heads and tails in the throws of a penny, there is
no limit to the magnitude of the fluctuations which may and
will occur. Postulate as long a succession of heads or of tails
as we please, and if we could only live and toss long enough
for it we should succeed in getting it at length. In other
cases, including many of the applications of Probability
to natural phenomena, there can hardly fail to be such
limits. Deviations exceeding a certain range may not be
merely improbable, that is of very rare occurrence, but they
may often from the nature of the case be actually impossible. And even when they are not actually impossible it
may frequently appear on examination that they are only
rendered possible by the occasional introduction of agencies
which are not supposed to be available in the production
of the more ordinary or intermediate values. When, for
instance, we are making observations with any kind of
instrument, the nature of its construction may put an
absolute limit upon the possible amount of error. And even
if there be not an absolute limit under all kinds of usage
it may nevertheless be the case that there is one under
fair and proper usage; it being the case that only when
the instrument is designedly or carelessly tampered with will
any new causes of divergence be introduced which were not
confined within the old limits.
Suppose, for instance, that a man is firing at a mark. His worst shots must be supposed to be brought about by a combination of such causes as were acting, or prepared to act, in every other case; the extreme instance of what we may thus term 'fair usage' being when a number of distinct causes have happened to conspire together so as
