Opinion of the Court
scheme at issue here differently. It could have mandated harsher punishment under subsection (j) than under subsection (c). It could have added a consecutive-sentence mandate to subsection (j). It could have written subsection (c)’s consecutive-sentence mandate more broadly. It could have placed subsection (j) within subsection (c).[1]
But Congress did not do any of these things. And we must implement the design Congress chose. *** Because the consecutive-sentence mandate in §924(c)(1)(D)(ii) does not govern §924(j) sentences, the District Court had discretion to impose Lora’s §924(j) sentence concurrently with another sentence. We vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
- ↑ Congress specifically considered and rejected that last possibility. The 1994 Congress had before it a proposal to add, within subsection (c), a provision authorizing the death penalty when a subsection (c) violation results in homicide. See 140 Cong. Rec. 11165, 24066. Congress rejected that option and enacted a different version of that crime bill—which created subsection (j).