Syllabus
(a) Sections 924(c) and 924(j) criminalize the use, carrying, and possession of firearms in connection with certain crimes. Subsection (c) lays out a set of offenses and their corresponding penalties. It also mandates that a “term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this subsection” must run consecutively with other sentences. §924(c)(1)(D)(ii). Subsection (j) likewise lays out offense elements and corresponding penalties. Unlike subsection (c), subsection (j) contains no consecutive-sentence mandate. Pp. 3–4.
(b) Subsection (c)’s consecutive-sentence mandate applies only to the terms of imprisonment prescribed within subsection (c). A sentence imposed under subsection (j) does not qualify. Subsection (j) is located outside subsection (c) and does not call for imposing any sentence from subsection (c). And while subsection (j) references subsection (c), that reference is limited to offense elements, not penalties. Pp. 4–5.
(c) Congress did not, as the Government maintains, incorporate §924(c) as a whole into §924(j) such that a §924(j) defendant faces subsection (j)’s penalties plus subsection (c)’s penalties. Subsection (j) nowhere mentions—let alone incorporates—subsection (c)’s penalties. Moreover, as subsections (c) and (j) are written, a sentencing court cannot always obey both sets of penalties. To avert potential conflict between subsections (c) and (j), the Government points to another provision, §924(c)(5), as a model. But assuming without deciding whether §924(c)(5) operates as the Government says, Congress did not implement that design in subsection (j). Equally unavailing is the Government’s argument that, under double jeopardy principles, a defendant cannot receive both subsection (c) and subsection (j) sentences for the same conduct. That view of double jeopardy can easily be squared with the conclusion that subsection (j) neither incorporates subsection (c)’s penalties nor triggers the consecutive-sentence mandate. Pp. 5–8.
(d) It is not “implausible,” as the Government asserts, for Congress to have imposed the harsh consecutive-sentence mandate under subsection (c) but not subsection (j), which covers more serious offense conduct. That result is consistent with the statute’s design. Unlike subsection (c), subsection (j) generally eschews mandatory penalties in favor of sentencing flexibility. Of a piece, subsection (j) permits flexibility to choose between concurrent and consecutive sentences. Congress chose a different approach to punishment in subsection (j) than in subsection (c), and the Court must implement the design Congress chose. Pp. 8–10.
Vacated and remanded.
