grade services—the PLAA, PLAN, PLAAF, and PLARF—and four deputy-theater-grade forces or service arms: the ASF, CSF, ISF, and the Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF).
- The Joint Logistic Support Force. The JLSF is concentrating its efforts on improving joint strategic and campaign-level logistic efficiencies through training and integrating civilian products and services. The JLSF supports multimodal transportation methods to facilitate the movement of PLA forces and equipment for training. During wartime or mobilization, the JLSF probably will rely on its military representative offices and dispatch centers to route military traffic.
- PLA Reserves, Paramilitary, and Militia Forces. Interoperability and integration between the PLA, its reserve components, and the PRC’s paramilitary forces continue to grow in scale and sophistication, including the coordination between the PLAN, the China Coast Guard (CCG), and the China Maritime Militia (CMM). The PRC primarily relies on its CCG and CMM for maritime coercion while selectively using the PLAN to provide overwatch to deter rival claimants and quickly respond with force, if necessary. The People’s Armed Police (PAP) is an additional paramilitary component of the PRC’s armed forces. Its primary missions include internal security, maritime security, and augmentation to the PLA during conflict.
- Special Operations Forces (SOF). Despite unilateral and multilateral training, all PRC SOF units lack real-world combat experience. PRC SOF do not have a national-level special operations command to oversee all SOF activities. Despite an emphasis on joint training, theater commanders have no authority over PAP units, making it difficult to incorporate PAP SOF into PLA training exercises.
- PLA Capabilities in Development. The PLA remains focused on developing capabilities to provide options for the PRC to dissuade, deter, or, if ordered, defeat third-party intervention in the Indo-Pacific region. The PLA continues developing the capabilities to conduct military operations deeper into the Indo-Pacific region and globally. The PLA has undertaken important structural reforms and introduced new military doctrine to strengthen joint operations and is testing joint capabilities in and beyond the FIC.
- Joint Capabilities for Power Projection. The PLA continues to increase its military capabilities to achieve the PRC’s regional and global security objectives beyond its immediate periphery. The PLA has primarily emphasized power projection capabilities in the maritime domain while its joint operational capabilities beyond the FIC remain limited. Improvements in PLA air and naval systems enable PLA forces to operate further from the PRC for longer.
- Advancements Toward an Informatized and Intelligentized Military. The PLA considers information operations (IO) as a means of achieving information superiority early in a conflict, which it considers a critical requirement for the success of any military campaign, and continues to expand the scope and frequency of IO in military exercises. The PRC presents a significant, persistent cyber-enabled espionage and attack threat to an adversary’s military and critical infrastructure systems. The PLA is pursuing next-generation combat capabilities based on its vision of future conflict, which it calls “intelligentized warfare,” defined by the expanded
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Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China
