Opinion of the Court
39–40, 42. Appealing to “traditional principles of in rem jurisdiction,” Transform reasons that the transfer of a res to a good-faith purchaser removes it from the bankruptcy estate, and so from the court’s in rem jurisdiction over the estate. Id., at 24, 39–40. And it thus concludes that §363(m) is jurisdictional, because it operates to ensure that (absent a stay) courts cannot disturb a transfer to a good-faith purchaser, thereby “confirm[ing]” the traditional in rem truth that “the bankruptcy court cannot reach the res, and thus has no basis for the exercise of in rem jurisdiction over it.” Id., at 39–40.
This argument teeters on a contorted framing of contested general background principles rather than §363(m)’s text and context (which, as we have said, lack any clear jurisdictional hue). Moreover, even setting aside MOAC’s credible retort that traditional in rem jurisdiction did not necessarily cease when the res left a court’s custody, Reply Brief 6–9, Transform’s contentions about §363(m)’s relationship to traditional in rem jurisdiction merely offer a reason to think Congress intended §363(m) to be jurisdictional. That, without more, is not enough. See Boechler, 596 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6). Transform does not (because it cannot) deny the paucity of textual or contextual clues indicating a clear statement of jurisdictional intent. See Part III–B, supra. And whatever else one might say about Transform’s clear-statement case, it certainly has not shown that §363(m)’s supposed alignment with allegedly pre-existing jurisdictional truths is so powerful that it nullifies these otherwise compelling nonjurisdictional inferences.
Section §363(m)’s operation further derails this bankshot argument. Transform’s assertion is that §363(m) is jurisdictional because it “confirms” a traditional truth that bankruptcy courts exercising in rem jurisdiction cannot touch a res that is transferred out of the estate. Brief for Respondent 39. But that sits uncomfortably with §363(m)’s
