does good and that which averts ill, according to what you heard of his sayings. — Simmias: Is there any other term besides these two or not? — Aristotle: One other term remains; if it be added to these others, nothing is left out. — Simmias: What is that? — Aristotle: Things are of three sorts: the thing which both does good and averts ill; that which averts ill, but induces no good; and that which does harrn. — Simmias: What is it that does harm? — Aristotle: A thing which averts ill, when carried to excess, so as to become detrimental. — Simmias: This subject is concluded. My mind is as much brightened by your instruction as the eye of the seer by the light of day. Now tell me: Is there any affinity between that which gives brightness to the mind and that which gives brightness to the eye? Or, is there any resemblance between the mind and the eye? — Aristotle: They are things which do not resemble each other so much in substance as in function. If you have received the answer to your question, let Diogenes speak. — Simmias became silent. — Diogenes then said: I have observed that those philosophers whose mental vision has been most acute have been the most temperate. Now tell me: Do goodness and temperance spring from brightness of mental vision or not? — Aristotle: There are different sorts of passions and divers sorts of intellects. Over against each passion there is an intellect best capable of opposing that passion. Lust in its nature is not the essence of folly, but each is a separate essence, though both are at one in harming the philosopher and keeping him from his recompense. Nor again is that faculty and quality which recommends self-restraint identical with the faculty and quality which overcomes folly and brings knowledge; neither are they opposed to each other; rather is there resemblance and also diversity between the two, like the resemblance and diversity between running water and ice; the one being fine and rare, the other hard and coarse; just so is fine ignorance opposed to fine knowledge, and strong piety to strong lust. And if a man’s habit of temperance is weak and his property of knowledge strong,
