it withdraws and carefully secludes itself, then it is time to suspect that clouds are gathering. The question, therefore, whether men-of-war shall be permitted to pass the Dardanelles in times of peace, although by no means unimportant, is to my way of thinking not sufficiently important to inflame Europe.
The question whether the possession of the Dardanelles shall be shifted to other owners is entirely different. It constitutes, however, a conjectural eventuality which the present situation does not contemplate, I believe, and on which I shall, therefore, express no opinion. My only concern at present is to give an approximate definition, as best I can, of those weighty interests which may lead to another war after the Russian-Turkish war has been actually concluded. For this reason I deem it important to affirm that the stipulations of peace concerning the Dardanelles mean less for the men-of-war than for the merchant marine. The preeminent German interest in the Orient demands that the waterways, the straits as well as the Danube from the Black Sea upward, shall continue as free and open to us as they have been until now. I rather infer that we shall surely obtain this, for as a matter of fact it has never even been questioned. An official communication on this point which I have received from St. Petersburg simply refers to the existing stipulations of the treaty of Paris. Nothing is jeopardized; our position can be no worse and no better than it has been.
The interest which we have in a better government of a Christian nation and in the safeguards against those acts of violence which have occurred at times, under Turkish rule, is taken care of by the agreements mentioned above. And this is the second interest which Germany has in this whole affair. It is less direct, but is dictated by humanity.
The rest of the preliminary stipulations consists—I will not say of phrases, for it is an official paper—but it has no bearing on our present discussion.
With these explanations I have answered to the best of
