affair, and you will agree with me that this was highly probable. But in those days we could observe that it is not so very easy for Europe to attack Austria and Prussia when they are united ; and remember that the German federation which supported these two states at that time had not nearly the same military importance which the identical countries possess today. The difficulty of an attack on Austria and Prussia showed itself even then, but the danger of a war remained the same.
In 1865 it faced about, and the preparations for the war of 1866 were beginning. I only remember a meeting of the Prussian cabinet which took place in Regensburg in 1865 with a view to procuring the necessary money, but which was rendered futile by the agreement of Gastein. In 1866, however, the war broke out in full force, as you know. A circumspect use of events alone enabled us to ward off the existing danger of turning this duel between Prussia and Austria into a fierce European war of coalition, when our very existence, our life and all we had, would have been at stake.
This was in 1866, and in 1867 the Luxembourg problem arose, when only a somewhat firmer reply was needed to bring about the great French war in that year,—and we might have given it, if we had been so strong that we could have counted on sure success. From then on, during 1868, 1869, and up to 1870 we were living in constant apprehension of war, and of the agreements which in the time of Mr. von Beust were being made in Salzburg and other places between France, Italy, and Austria, and which, we feared, were directed against us. The apprehension of war was so great at that time that I received calls—I was the president of the cabinet—from merchants and manufacturers, who said: "The uncertainty is unbearable. Why don't you strike the first blow? War is preferable to this continued damper on all business!" We waited quietly until we were struck, and I believe we did well to arrange
