sition of how certain arrangements, for instance, the three-class suffrage, is pernicious. I am unable to confute this teaching. But I have this to say with respect to the organic unity of human nature, that if the doctrine is true then it follows that every normally constituted working man must come to hate and distrust not only these arrangements and institutions but also those who profit by them.
Such is the logical framework on which this indictment must proceed. This is the line of argument which avowedly or not, by logical necessity comes to expression in this indictment.
It is not I, but the public prosecutor speaking from the eminence of his curule chair, who proclaims to the working classes the awful doctrine: You must hate and distrust.
It is not for me, it is for the public prosecutor to square himself with the bourgeoisie.
But what is my answer to the public prosecutor and his indictment which charges me with his own offense?
My answer is a four-fold one:
In the first place a full recognition of the inadequacy or the viciousness of a given institution must arouse in any person of normal sensibility an enduring purpose to change such an institution, if possible, and the arousing of such an undying purpose in my hearers has necessarily been the aim of my scientific investigation, as it necessarily is the end of all scientific work. But such a purpose, so long as it does not utter itself in an illegal manner, is absolutely unconstrained by law. The like is true of all effort to arouse such a purpose, so long as it does not resort to illegal means. But such a purpose to amend the shortcomings of any established arrangement, is by no means the same thing as hatred and contempt of the arrangement in question; since these shortcomings are a matter of historical growth, of historical necessity; since, indeed, they may even be, in effect, a factor in the work of liberation, and a factor of the gravest consequence and of the most beneficial effect for cultural growth. Further
