382 PLATO
hitherto honored and revered I still honor, and unless we can at once find other and better principles, I am certain not to agree with you ; no, not even if the power of the multitude could inflict many more im- prisonments, confiscations, deaths, frightening us like children Λvith hobgoblin terrors. What will be the fairest way of considering the question ? Shall I re- turn to your old argument about the opinions of men ?
— we were saying that some of them are to be re- garded, and others not. Now were we right in main- taininof this before I was condemned ? And has the argument which was once good now proved to be talk for the sake of talking — mere childish nonsense ? That is what I want to consider with your help, Crito :
— whether, under my present circumstances, the argu- ment api^ears to be in any way different or not ; and is to be allowed by me or disallowed. That argument, which, as I belieΛ'e, is maintained by many persons of authority, was to the effect, as I was saying, that the opinions of some men are to be regarded, and of other men not to be regarded. Xow you, Crito, are not going to die to-morrow — at least, there is no hu- man probability of this — and therefore you are dis- interested, and not liable to be deceived by the cir- cumstances in which you are placed. Tell me then, whether I am right in saying that some opinions, and the opinions of some men only, are to be valued, and that other opinions, and the opinions of other men, are not to be valued. I ask you whether I was right in maintaining this ?
Crito. Certainly.
Socrates. The good are to be regarded, and not the bad?
Crito. Yes.
