CRITO 387
Socrates. Then we ought not to retaliate or render evil for evil to any one, whatever evil we may have suf- fered from him. But I would have you consider, Crito, whether you really mean what you are saying. For this opinion has never been held, and never will be held, by any considerable number of persons ; and those who are agreed and those who are not agfreed upon this point have no common ground, and can only despise one another when they see how widely they differ. Tell me, then, whether you agree with and assent to my first principle, that neither injury, nor retaliation, nor warding off evil by evil is ever right. And shall that be the premises of our argument ? Or do you decline and dissent from this ? For so I have ever thought and continue to think ; but, if you are of another opinion, let me hear what you have to say. If, however, you remain of the same mind as formerly, I will proceed to the next step.
Crito. You may proceed, for I have not changed my mind.
Socrates. Then I will go on to the next point, which may be put in the form of a question : Ought a man to do what he admits to be right, or ought he to betray the right ?
Crito. He ought to do what he thinks right.
Socrates. But if this is true, what is the applica- tion ? In leaving the prison against the will of the Athenians, do I wrong any ? or rather do I not wrong those whom I ought least to wrong ? Do I not desert the principles which were acknowledged by us to be just — what do you say ?
Crito. I cannot tell, Socrates ; for I do not know.
Socrates. Then consider the matter in this way : Imagine that I am about to play truant (you may call
