In Philosophical Controversies.
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against the Truth, not the sense of the Scripture (which is beyond his comprehension) but rather his own; not what is in it, but what, finding it in himself, he fancyed to be in it.
This granted, and it being true, (as hath been said) that two Truths cannot be contrary to each other, it is the office of a Judicious Expositor to study to finde the true Senses of Sacred Texts, which undoubtedly shall accord with those Natural Conclusions, of which manifest Sense and Necessary Demonstrations had before made us sure and certain. Yea, in regard that the Scriptures (as hath been said) for the Reasons alledged, admit in many places Expositions far from the Sense of the words; and moreover, we not being able to affirm, that all Interpreters speak by Divine Inspiration; For (if it were so) then there would be no difference between them about the Senses of the same places; I should think that it would be an act of great prudence to make it unlawful for any one to usurp Texts of Scripture, and as it were to force them to maintain this or that Naturall Conclusion for truth, of which Sence, & Demonstrative, and necessary Reasons may one time or other assure us the contrary. For who will prescribe bounds to the Wits of men? Who will assert that all that is sensible and knowable in the World is already discovered and known? Will not they that in other points disagree with us, confess this (and it is a great truth) that Eaquæ scimus, sint minima pars corum quæ ignoramus? That those Truths which we know, are very few, in comparison of those which we know not? Nay more, if we have it from the Mouth of the Holy Ghost, that Ecclesiast. cap. 3.Deus tradidit Mundum disputationi eorum, ut non inveniat homo opus, quod operatus est Deus ab initio ad finem: One ought not, as I conceive, to stop the way to free Philosophating, touching the things of the World, and of Nature, as if that they were already certainly found, and all manifest: nor ought it to be counted rashness, if one do not sit down satisfied with the opinions now become as it were commune; nor ought any persons to be displeased, if others do not hold, in natural Disputes to that opinion which best pleaseth them; and especially touching Problems that have, for thousands of years, been controverted amongst the greatest Philosophers, as is the Stability of the Sun, and Mobility of the Earth, an opinion held by Pythagoras, and by his whole Sect; by Heraclides Ponticus, who was of the same opininion; by Phylolaus, the Master of Plato; and by Plato himself, as Aristotle relateth, and of which Plutarch writeth in the life of Numa, that the said Plato, when he was grown old, said, It is a most absurd thing to think otherwise: The same was believed by Aristarchus Samius, as we have it in Archimedes; and probably by Archimedes him-self;
