more a friend to that institution than I was before. I had seen slavery in Maryland, Kentucky, Virginia, and Missouri, but it was not till I saw these great Louisiana plantations, with all their apparatus for living and working, that I really felt the aristocratic nature of the institution and the infernal baseness of that aristocracy. Every day my conviction was intensified that the territorial and political integrity of the nation must be preserved at all costs and no matter how long it took; that it was better to keep up the existing war as long as was necessary rather than to make arrangement for indefinite wars hereafter and for other disruptions; that we must have it out then, and settle forever the question, so that our children would be able to attend to other matters. For my own part, I preferred one nation and one country, with a military government afterwards, if such should follow, rather than two or three nations and countries with the semblance of the old Constitution in each of them, ending in wars and despotisms everywhere.
grant's new plan of campaign.
As soon as I arrived at Milliken's Bend on April 6th I hunted up Grant and explained my mission. He received me cordially. Indeed, I think Grant was always glad to have me with his army. He did not like letter writing, and my daily despatches to Mr. Stanton relieved him from the necessity of describing every day what was going on in the army. From the first neither he nor any of his staff or corps commanders evinced any unwillingness to show me the inside of things. In this first interview at Milliken's Bend, for instance, Grant explained to me so fully a new plan of campaign against Vicksburg which he had just adopted that by three o'clock I was able to send an outline of it to Mr. Stanton, and from that time I saw and knew all the interior operations of that toughest of tough jobs—the reopening of the Mississippi.
The new project, so Grant told me, was to transfer his army to New Carthage (see map, page 161); from there carry it over the Mississippi, landing at or about Grand Gulf; capture this point, and then operate rapidly on the southern and eastern shore of the Big Black River, threatening at the same time both Vicksburg and Jackson, and confusing the Confederates as to his real objective. If this could be done, he believed the enemy would come out of Vicksburg and fight.
The first element in this plan was to open a passage from the Mississippi, near Milliken's Bend, above Vicksburg, to the bayou on the west side, which led around to New Carthage below. The work on this canal was already begun. A part of one of the army corps—that under General John A. McClernand—had already reached New Carthage, and Grant was hurrying other troops forward.
The second and perhaps most vital part of the plan was to float down the river, past the Vicksburg batteries, a half-dozen steamboats protected by defenses of bales of cotton and wet hay, and loaded with supplies and munitions for the troops to operate from the new base below.
Perhaps the best evidence of the feasibility of the project was found in the fact that the river men pronounced its success certain. General W. T. Sherman, who commanded one of the three corps (the Fifteenth) in Grant's army and with whom I conversed at length upon the subject, thought there was no difficulty in opening the passage, but that the line would be a precarious one (for supplies) after the army was thrown across the Mississippi. But it was not long in our daily talks before I saw his mind was tending to the conclusion of General Grant. As for General Grant, his purpose from its conception was dead set on the new scheme. Admiral Porter cordially agreed with him.
There seemed to be only one hitch in the campaign. Grant had intrusted the attack on Grand Gulf to General McClernand, who had already advanced as far as New Carthage with part of his corps. Now McClernand was thoroughly distrusted by the majority of the officers in Grant's army. They believed him ambitious to capture Vicksburg on his own responsibility, and thought that hearty co-operation with the rest of the army could not be expected from him. There was some reason for this feeling. McClernand was an Illinois Democrat who had resigned from Congress at the breaking out of the war and returned home to raise the body of troops known as the McClernand Brigade. President Lincoln, anxious to hold him and his friends to the war, had appointed McClernand a brigadier-general of volunteers, and had in many ways favored his plans and advanced his interests. McClernand and his division did good service at Fort Donelson and Shiloh, and in December, 1862, he was appointed to the com-
