Page:Memoirs of Henry Villard, volume 2.djvu/226

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208
HENRY VILLARD
[1863

great bend of the river below Chattanooga and known as Moccasin Point. While it was ten miles by water around the bend, it was not quite a mile across it in an air line from the north end of the main bridge of the town. The south bank being seized, supplies could be brought up the river from Bridgeport, landed at Moccasin Point, and thence hauled in wagons to the town. There were two steamboats and some barges available for the water transportation. The success of the plan would reduce the time from Bridgeport to one day each way, and thus solve the problem of sustaining the army. To carry it out, it was judged best that the initial attempt to effect a lodgment on the south bank should be made from Chattanooga, but that it should be supported by a simultaneous movement up the river by General Hooker's command.

It was ordained that General Rosecrans should not him self execute this clever plan. He had fully made up his mind to carry it out, and had already issued preliminary orders, including one to Hooker to concentrate his command, when his powers as commander-in-chief were suddenly cut off. A thunderbolt had been forging against him in Washington and descended upon him on October 18, in the form of a telegraphic Presidential order dated the 16th, relieving him from the command of the Department of the Cumberland, and directing him to proceed to Cincinnati and report by letter to the Adjutant-General of the army. By the same order, Major-General George H. Thomas was appointed his successor. This summary dismissal came as a stunning surprise to the doomed general. I can affirm from personal knowledge that while he had been apprehensive of removal after the battle, the tone of President Lincoln's subsequent despatches to him, and the fact that weeks had gone by without any indication of other intentions towards him, had led him to believe in his retention in command. He was wise enough not to give utterance to his feelings, and to leave at once for the North even before the change of command became known to the army. When