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CONTENTS
| Ch. | ||
| 25. | 'Part.' | |
| 26. | 'Whole.' 'Total,' 'All.' | |
| 27. | 'Mutilated.' | |
| 28. | 'Race' or 'genus' (γένος), 'Other in genus.' | |
| 29. | 'False.' | |
| 30. | 'Accident.' | |
| Ε. | ||
| 1. | Distinction of 'theology], the science of being as such, from the other theoretical sciences, mathematics and physics. | |
| 2. | Four senses of 'being'. Of these (i) accidental being is the object of no science. | |
| 3. | The nature and origin of accident. | |
| 4. | (ii) Being as truth is not primary being. | |
| Ζ. | ||
| 1. | The study of being is primarily the study of substance. | |
| 2. | Various opinions on the question, what things are substances? | |
| 3. | Four things are commonly held to be substantial—the essence, the universal, the genus, the substratum. The last may be conceived as matter, form, or the concrete individual. Reasons why matter and the concrete individual cannot be primary substance. Form to be studied first in sensible things. | |
| 4. | What is essence and to what does it belong, i.e. what things can be defined? Primarily substance. | |
| 5. | Combinations of a subject with one of its proper attributes have no definition nor essence. | |
| 6. | Is a thing the same as its essence? Yes, if it is a substance. | |
| 7. | Analysis of generation, whether by nature, art, or spontaneity. | |
| 8. | Form is not generated, but put into matter; yet it did not previously exist apart—the agent in generation is form embodied in another individual of the same species. | |
| 9. | Why spontaneous generation sometimes takes place. The conditions of generation in the categories other than substance. | |
| 10. | When are definitions of the parts included in the definition of the whole? When the parts are parts of the form. | |
| 11. | Which parts are parts of the form, which of the concrete individual? | |
| 12. | Wherein consists the unity of an object of definition? In the appropriateness of the differentia to the genus. | |
| 13. | A universal cannot be either the substance or an element in the substance of anything (yet how else can a thing be defined?). | |
| 14. | Hence it is fatal to make Ideas substances and yet hold that they are composed of other Ideas. | |
| 15. | No individual can be defined, whether sensible or, like the Ideas, intelligible. | |
| 16. | The parts of sensible things are only potencies. Unity and being are not the substance of things. | |
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