man, and in general who is likely to judge rightly on each class of questions. But such inquiries are like puzzling over the question whether we are now asleep or awake. And all such questions have the same meaning. These people demand that a reason shall be given for everything; for they seek a starting-point, and they wish to get this by demonstration, while it is obvious from their actions that they have no conviction. But their mistake is what we have stated it to be; they seek a reason for that for which no reason can be given; for the starting-point of demonstration is not demonstration.
These, then, might be easily persuaded of this truth, for it is not difficult to grasp; but those who seek merely compulsion in ailment seek what is impossible; for they demand to be made to contradict themselves, while they are contradicting themselves from the very first. — But if not all things are relative, but some are self-existent, not everything that appears will be true; for that which appears appears to some one; so that he who says all things that appear are true, makes all things relative. And, therefore, those who ask for an irresistible argument, and at the same time demand to be called to account for their views, must guard themselves by saying that the truth is not that what appears exists, but that what appears exists for him to whom it appears, and when, and in the sense in which, and in the way in which it appears. And if they give an account of their view, but do not give it in this way, they will soon find themselves contradicting themselves. For it is possible that a thing may for the same man appear as honey to the sight, but not to the taste, and that, as we have two eyes, things may not appear the same to each, if the eyes are unlike. For to those who for the reasons named above[1] say that what appears is true, and therefore that all things are alike false and true, for things do not appear either the same to all men or always the same to the same man, but (often have contrary appearances at the same time (for touch says there are two objects when we cross our fingers, while sight says there is one), — to these we shall say 'yes, but not to the same sense and in the same part of it and in the same way and
- ↑ Cf. 1009b 1.
