of realities will be not only made half as great again, but even greater. For again it will be possible to deny this intermediate with reference both to its assertion and to its negation,[1] and this new term will be some definite thing; for its essence is something different. — Again, when a man, on being asked whether a thing is white, says 'no' he has denied nothing except that it is; and its not being is a negation.
Some people have acquired this opinion as other paradoxical opinions have been acquired; when men cannot refute eristical arguments, they give in to the argument and agree that the conclusion is true. This, then, is why some argue in such fashion; others do so because they demand a reason for everything. And the starting-point in dealing with all such people is definition. Now the definition rests on the necessity of their meaning something; for the formula, of which the word is a sign, becomes its definition. — The doctrine of Heraclitus, that all things are and are not, seems to make everything true, while that of Anaxagoras, that there is an intermediate between the terms of a contradiction, seems to make everything false[2]; for when things are mixed, the mixture is neither good nor not- good, so that one cannot say anything that is true.
Chapter 8
In view of these distinctions it is obvious that the one-sided theories which some people express about all things cannot be valid — on the one hand the theory that nothing is true (for, say they, there is nothing to prevent every statement from being like the statement 'the diagonal of a square is commensurate with the side'), — on the other hand the theory that everything is true. — These views are practically the same as that of Heraclitus; for that which says that 'all things are true and all are false' also makes each of these statements separately, so that since they are impossible, the double statement must be impossible too. — Again, there are obviously contradictories which cannot be at the same time true. Nor
