as the tête de pont fell, Worth's and Pillow's divisions rushed onward by the highway towards the city, which now rose in full sight before them, at the distance of four miles. Bounding onward, flushed and exultant, they encountered Shields' division, now also victorious, and all combined in the headlong pursuit of the flying foe. At length the columns parted, and a small part of Harney's cavalry, led by Captain Kearney of the 1st dragoons, dashed to the front and charged the retreating Mexicans up to the very gates of the city.
Thus terminated the first series of American victories in the valley of Mexico.
Note. It is ungracious to criticize unfavorably the conduct of a conquered foe, but there are some things in Santa Anna's behavior at Contreras and Churubusco, which must not be passed silently. At Contreras, he came with aid, by a short and fine highway, to the field at a late period, when the Americans, moving slowly over an unknown and broken country, had already outflanked with a strong force, Valencia's left, and he then made no effort whatever, with his large support, to relieve the beleagured general. If he did not design doing any thing, why did he come at all; and, if as he says, he believed Valencia could, during the night, withdraw all his forces, after spiking his guns, by a secret path of which he apprised him, why did he not take the same path to aid him? Did he believe that it was best to lose Valencia and his division only, without risking the loss of the large support under his own command? In the morning of the 20th it was certainly too late for action, but Santa Anna must have been convinced, when he ordered the retreat from the Hacienda of San Antonio, and thus voluntarily opened a gate for Worth's advance, that now, if ever, had arrived the moment for a general action in front of the city, the key of which, on the main road, was the convent of Churubusco and the adjacent works. The loss of Valencia's army and materiel was undoubtedly disheartening, but, according to his own account, Santa Anna had been prepared for an event which he foresaw. This should not have destroyed his self-possession if he sincerely desired victory. When Contreras fell, he had, in reality, only lost a division consisting of five or six thousand men. The whole centre and left wing of his army were untouched, and these must have numbered at least 20,000. Yet, if we admit the brave resistance of the garrison, only hastily thrown into the convent and works at Churubusco, it may then be asked what masterly effort Santa Anna made (at the moment when he had actually drawn the American army into the valley) to bring on a general action with all the fresh troops either under his own command or under that of obedient, brave, skilful, and patriotic officers? The Mexican accounts of these actions, and in fact, his own despatch from Tehuacan, dated 19th Nov. 1847, exhibit no able manœuvres on the last field with which he was perfectly and personally familiar. The Americans stormed a single point,—and the battle was over, though bravely fought by those who were under cover and by the traitor battalion of San Patricio, formed of renegades from our army. The despatches of Santa Anna, like most of the Mexican despatches after military or political disaster, seem rather designed to criminate others, and to throw the whole blame of ultimate complete defeat on Valencia, than to point out the causes of conquest in spite of able generalship after the fall of Contreras. See Santa Anna's despatches, Mexico 23 Aug. 1847; and Tehuacan, 19 Nov. 1847, in Pillow's Court Martial, pp. 532 and 540. See also Apuntes para la historia de la guerra, &c, &c, chapters XVII—XVIII—XIX, and Ripley's History of the War, vol. 2, p. 256; "No part of the Mexican force was ready for battle, except Rincon's command," says this writer.
