musket ammunition. Three thousand two hundred and fifty-one Americans, had on this day, driven four times their number from a selected field; but they had paid a large and noble tribute to death for the victory. Nine officers were included in the one hundred and sixteen of our killed, and forty-nine officers in the six hundred and sixty-five of our wounded. The Mexicans suffered greatly in wounded and slain, while the gallant General Leon and Colonel Balderas fell fighting bravely on the field of battle.[1]
The battle was over by nine o'clock in the morning. The Americans, after collecting their dead and wounded, retired from the bloody field, but they were not allowed to mourn over their painful losses. They had suffered severely, yet the battle had been most disastrous to the Mexicans. The fine commands of Generals Perez and Leon and of Colonel Balderas, were broken up; the position once destroyed, could not serve for a second defence, and the morale of the soldiers had suffered. The Mexicans were beginning to believe that mere formidable masses, if not directed by skilful chiefs, were, in truth, but harmless things, and not to be relied on very confidently for national defence. The new levies, the old regular
- ↑ This was a great but a rash victory. The American infantry relying chiefly on the bayonet and expecting to effect its object by surprise and even at an earlier hour of the morning, advanced with portions of the three thousand two hundred and fifty-one men to attack at least eleven or twelve thousand Mexicans upon a field selected by themselves, protected by stone walls and ditches, commanded by the fortress of Chapultepec and the ground swept by artillery, while four thousand cavalry threatened an overwhelming charge! We have no criticism to make as to inequality of numbers, but although we believe that our officers did not anticipate so strong a resistance, we are satisfied that it would have been better to rely at first upon the fatal work of mortars and siege pieces, of which we had abundance, and, then, to have permitted the bayonet to complete the task the battering train had begun. If the difficulty of moving rapidly to the scene of action in the night, prevented a night attack and surprise, it would probably have been better to change the plan of battle even at a late hour. In the end, Duncan's great guns, effectually destroyed a post which had been the slaughter house of many a noble American soldier. The Mexican cavalry behaved shamefully. In Colonel Ramsey's notes on the translation of the Mexican Apuntes para la historia de la Guerra, &c. , p. 347, he says: "it is now known in Mexico that Santa Anna was in possession of General Scott's order to attack the Molino del Rey in a few hours after it was written, and during the whole of the 7th, troops were taking up their positions on that ground. It is believed further that Santa Anna knew the precise force that was to attack. When, therefore, Scott supposed that Worth would surprise the Mills and Casa Mata, he was met by what? Shall the veil be raised a little further? There was a traitor among the list of high ranking officers in the Mexican army, and for gold he told the Mexican force. Scott had been betrayed by one not an American, not an officer or soldier, but Santa Anna was betrayed by one of his own officers and a Mexican. Santa Anna believed the information he received and acted on it. General Scott did not believe what he learned at night, and—the victory was won!"
