powder and ball. In addition to these cogent reasons for not advancing, a courier was intercepted, with dispatches from Calleja, who had already reached Qŭerētărŏ on his way towards the Capital; so that there was every reason to suppose that he would push on by forced marches, and inclose the besiegers between his own force, and that of the Viceroy. To avoid this danger Hidalgo commenced his retreat, much to the dissatisfaction of Allende, his second in command; but his measures were so badly taken, that one might almost imagine him to have sought the peril from which he was endeavouring to escape. After a march of six days, his advanced guard, most unexpectedly, fell in with Calleja's outposts, who, on their side, were equally ignorant of the approach of the Insurgents. Calleja's troops were composed principally of Creole regiments. His cavalry was commanded by the Conde de la Cadena; and his army possessed all the advantages that superior discipline and arms could give; but it remained to be seen what effect the appearance of their countrymen, fighting for a cause, in which all Mexicans were equally interested, might produce upon their minds.
This great question was decided, on the 7th of November, 1810, in the plains of Ăcūlcŏ. Officers who were present at the action have assured me, that the troops were wavering when they went into the field; and that, if Hidalgo had prevented his men from beginning hostilities, it was more than
