with the country, (which is extremely mountainous and intricate,) and an unlimited influence over the minds of his followers, made up for all deficiencies in point of numbers, and rendered Victoria, very shortly, the terror of the Spanish troops.
It was his practice to keep but a small body of men about his person, and only to collect his force upon great occasions: a mode of warfare well suited to the wild habits of the natives, and, at the same time, calculated to baffle all pursuit. The instant a blow was struck, a general dispersion followed: in the event of a failure, a rendezvous was fixed for some distant point; and thus losses were often repaired, before it was known in the Capital that they had been sustained at all.
Nor were Victoria's exploits confined to this desultory warfare: in 1815 he detained a convoy of 6000 mules, escorted by 2000 men, under the command of Colonel Aguila, at Pūēntĕ dĕl Rēy, (a pass, the natural strength of which the Insurgents had increased by placing artillery upon the heights, by which it is commanded,) nor did it reach Veracruz for upwards of six months. The necessity of keeping the channel of communication with Europe open, induced Calleja, in December 1815, to intrust the chief command, both Civil and Military, of the Province of Veracruz, to Don Fernando Mĭyārĕs, (an officer of high rank, and distinguished attainments, recently arrived from Spain,) for the special purpose of establishing a chain of
