2 A. E. TAYLOE I again, at page 48, I found Mr. Benn speaking of the " unan- imous tradition" of Greek philosophy that "like can only be known by like " in a way that showed that he must for the moment have forgotten the rival doctrine of perception by opposites hinted at by Heracleitus and elaborately worked out by Anaxagoras. And again I did not and do not know what to make of the remarkable assertion that *Parmenides identified space with "pure reason" (op. cit., p. 42). These are perhaps small points, but they do not augur altogether well for the accuracy or the judgment of the writer, and it is therefore with the less hesitation that I venture to call in question Mr. Benn's whole theory of Plato's later ontology. In holding that certain of the later Platonic dialogues represent a wholesale reconstruction of the metaphysical teaching of the Pheedo and Republic, Mr. Benn is, of course, in accord with Dr. Jackson and Mr. Archer-Hind. But it is rather disconcerting to find ihat his view of the line which the reconstruction took is directly opposed to theirs. Ac- cording to Mr. Archer-Hind the radical defect of the meta- physics of the Republic was Plato's failure to insist sufficiently upon the transcendence of the Idea and its absolute severance from the sensible thing ; according to Mr. Benn it is precisely this transcendence which the Republic teaches, and which it is the aim of the Parmenides and Timceus to do away with. The Parmenides, in fact, is intended to show that the tran- scendent Idea is a purely " nonsensical conception," while the Timceus provides us with a positive substitute for it. Thus, if Plato really in his old age undertook the remodelling of his fundamental doctrines, we must suppose that he expressed himself so obscurely that two learned and devoted students can contradict one another point-blank as to which is the original doctrine and which the amended version. I submit that the supposition is a most unlikely one, and that the disagreement of the interpreters strongly supports the view, which I wish to urge in this paper, that there is no real difference of principle, but only a difference in the fulness and mastery with which an identical principle is set forth, between the earlier and the later dialogues. In the present paper I propose to confine myself to the consideration of Mr. Benn's views on the Parmenides ; I may perhaps have the opportunity to deal with some points in his interpretation of the Timaus in a later article. The thesis which I wish to maintain is briefly this. There is no essential difference but a most essential agreement in respect to the position of the Ideas between the Parmenides
