88 A. E. TAYLOR: which is seen not to belong to it the moment it is read with atten- tion to the general connexion of my argument. Mr. Schiller begins his list by the remark that (loc. cit,, p. 352) the most striking of my " innovations " is my "constant use of the language of purpose and teleology," a use which he seems to think almost concedes the main position of Humanism, though he is dissatisfied with the working out of my conception of purpose in detail Now I suppose Mr. Schiller himself will hardly go so far as to claim that the categories of end and purpose are special dis- coveries of those whom he calls the " new " philosophers of the last twenty-seven years. For my own part, I had always imagined that I had learned the importance of these categories for our specu- lative thought long ago from the study of sources so familiar as Plato and Aristotle, and in more recent times Leibniz, all three philosophers who fall under the ban pronounced by our ' new ' creed-makers upon the benighted "Absolutist". If I were asked to produce a single " source " for my teleological way of thinking, apart from the writings of these philosophers as a whole, I do not know that I could find one, but, if I could, it would probably be the famous chapter of the Phcedo, so much admired by Leibniz, on the distinction between ground and accessory conditions (Phtzdo, pp. 98-99). In the working out of the bearing of this teleological conception upon our views of mechanism as an aspect of the universe, the only contemporary writers to whom I am conscious of any special debt are Dr. Ward and Prof. Royce, and in their case I have, I trust, made distinct and repeated acknowledgment of my obligation. (2) Mr. Schiller's next instance of unacknowledged conveyance from the " new " philosophers is a sentence in which I have spoken of metaphysics as arising from an " instinctive demand of our in- tellect ". Now in writing these words I imagined myself to be translating verbatim the remark with which Aristotle opens the Metaphysics that all men TOV ei8o/cu opeyo^rai (j>vo-ei, and to be echoing in part at least the tnot of a living philosopher for whom Mr. Schiller has been singularly fertile in devising opprobrious names that "Metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct, but to find these reasons is no less an instinct "- 1 And I may fairly appeal to the common sense of our readers to decide for me how far the simple assertion that we have an instinctive desire for truth commits him who makes it to the doctrine that truth is exclusively practical and that ' the useless is untrue '. (3) The next point on Mr. Schiller's list is my insistence upon the presence of Postulates in Science, a fact which a man need be no ' Pragmatist,' I conceive, to find sufficiently patent. But it is just in this very matter that my divergence from the views of the 1 It is, of course, mere controversial misrepresentation to exhibit either Mr. Bradley or myself as specimens of the mere or extreme intellectual ist position.
