DAVID G. RITCHIE, Philosophical Studies. 103 special characteristics of human society, which differentiate it from animal communities and which are the logical ground of ethical and political principles, by transferring biological concep- tions directly to ethics and politics.' Dr. Latta then goes on to give a very interesting account of some of Ritchie's views on the most important problems of practical ethics and politics. ' One part of practical ethics is the develop- ment or enlargement of the social ideal. And along with this there must go development in the means of realising the ideal, i.e. develop- ment of customs and institutions.' The case of marriage is taken as an illustration. "I do consider," says Ritchie himself in a letter, " that it is the business of the State (supposing a well- organised State) to regulate, if possible, the birth, and certainly the education of children so as to give them a fair chance of growing up into the best possible men and women, but that, apart from that end, the State should not interfere between fully grown indi- viduals ; and that the usual opinion of society, which condemns e.g. George Eliot and has nothing but sympathy for people who cause the existence of children with inherited diseases and who have no prospect of giving them a fair education, provided only they have gone through a religious ceremony, is mischievous in the extreme." Again, we are told that Ritchie ' had little if any sympathy either with narrow nationalism on the one hand or with vague cosmopolitanism on the other. But he believed firmly in the ideal of the federation of the world, agreeing with the doctrine of Kant that a permanent general peace can never be secured by treaties between independent nations, but only by the establishment of a federation of self-governing states, in which there is ultimately one sovereignty and attempts at war become equivalent to rebellion.' Some interesting particulars are also given with regard to Ritchie's views on the referendum (of which he approved), on disestablish- ment (of which he disapproved), and on the general problems of religion and philosophy. Apart from Prof. Latta' s memoir, which is extremely interesting, the contents of this volume will probably be found by most readers somewhat disappointing and tantalising ; or at least they will be best appreciated by those who consider them in close connexion with the general account of Ritchie's work and personality. Several of the papers here printed ' The Relation of Logic to Psychology,' ' The Relation of Metaphysics to Epistemology,' ' The One and the Many ' have already appeared in philosophical journals ; and their value, though considerable (that on ' The One and the Many,' in particular, is written with extraordinary brilliance) is, in general, more critical than constructive. At any rate, readers of MIND have probably had opportunities of forming their own judgments on these papers before now. The other papers have, from their general nature, a more permanent interest ; but their fragmentary char- acter detracts very seriously from their value. The most important is the Coyitatio Metaphysica, which is ' a general statement of his
