108 CRITICAL NOTICES. The admiration which we feel for this masterly little book is not lessened by what we conceive to be the limitations of the treat- ment. Thus, in the first place, the twofold standpoint is not a twofold method. Whichever standpoint is taken, the method re- mains introspective and inductive ; and the psychical life is studied as ' phenomenal '. In this respect the book may be taken as an application and extension of the views embodied by Mr. Bradley in his article on " Phenomenalism in Psychology " (MiND, Jan., 1900). The problem of a twofold psychological method (1) induc- tive, (2) teleological, is in fact left entirely undiscussed. The author recognises that the Self admits of philosophical as well as of psychological treatment, but she has said nothing to meet the objec- tion of a critic that a philosophical treatment may be psychological as well, and that a full discussion of psychological standpoints should include a discussion of a conception of a philosophical Psychology with a teleological method. Miss Calkins, as we have pointed out, refuses the assistance of the category of Causality in developing the Psychology of Self, on the ground that the Self is out of time. But if this is so, it is hard to see how it can be treated as a phenomenon by the ordinary methods of Natural Science. In the interests of clearness it is essential that the substitute for Causality should be clearly pointed out. And this is the more imperative as it is now commonly recognised that the true source of the Causality-category is in the very personal will that is here supposed to be able to dispense with it. A discussion of this point might be found to lead to the conclusion that a Psychology of the Self must in last resort be a teleological Psychology, requiring a teleological method. Finally, the failure of the author to analyse the significance of the intro- spective process upon which she relies throughout, leaves it un- decided whether there may not be a deeper point of view for psychological treatment than either of the two standpoints con- sidered, the point of view, namely, of the personal experient qud experiencing subject, and whether this point of view may not be found to coincide with what we have called the teleological point of view. One would like to know in what sense Miss Calkins supposes the Introspection of Self to be possible ? The Self is a subject, and is it possible, we ask, to introspect a subject (which is not an object) in the same sense as we introspect some sensational quality which, though psychical, as Prof. Stout would put it, is not subjective ? But behind all these questions lies the excellence of the treatment that suggested them. In the present welter of psychological method, Miss Calkins's book should prove of real assistance to those who are seeking for a secure footing and for safe guidance. It is eminently lucid, precise and suggestive, and can be most cordially and unreservedly recommended. W. E. BOYCE GIBSON.
