122 NEW BOOKS. result : 1. Paralysis or paresis, loss of movement or diminution of power ; 2. Ataxia, erroneous estimates of energy, or sweep of move- ment, due to loss of peripheral kinsesthetic directions ; 3. Loss of kinaesthetic ideas (Vorstellungen), psychical paralysis; 4, Agnosie, or sensory asymbolie, which is apraxia in the older sense of the term, defective identification of sensations, either through absence of memory images, or from obstructed combination of these with new impressions of sense ; 5. Cortical blindness, deafness, hemianopia, etc. ; 6. Motor (innervation) apraxia, which falls between 1, 2, 3 on the one side and 4, 5 on the other, the movement is not in accordance with the ideational process, the cortico- muscular apparatus is in order, but is not in the service of the total psychical process ; 7. Ideational Apraxia, where the movement is in accordance with the ideational process, but the latter is interrupted at the point where the Hauptzielvorstellung is converted into the Teilzielvorstellung . The relations of these activities is dis- cussed with much acuteness and the discussion is a valuable contribution to the place of the kinaesthetic sensations or " innervation " sensations in the psychical series. "W. LESLIE MACKENZIE. Theodule Ribot's Psychologie. Dargestellt von Dr. S. KRAUSS. Erster Teil. Jena : Hermann Costenoble, 1905. Pp. xvi, 170. This volume is the first of a series of tractates on recent French Psy- chology promised by the author. It consists, for the most part, of a careful exposition of Kibot's chief psychological writings. It is the work of a disciple, and there is a preface by M. Ribot himself in which he approves of the correctness of the account here given. What little criticism there is confines itself mainly to a reply to the objec- tions urged by such writers as Stumpf and Miinsterberg against various details in the French psychologist's theories. For German students the book will have a distinct value. The chief omission seems to be the absence of any metaphysical analysis of the presuppositions underlying a " Psychology without the soul ". G. R. T. Ross. Uid.ealismo moderno. GDIDO VILLA. Torino : Fratelli Bocca, 1905. Pp. 452. This is the tenth work published since 1898 by the author, who assuredly lets no grass grow beneath his strenuous tread. As in most of the others, notably in the Contemporary Psychology now published in four languages, he is still engaged in critically watching and summing up the trend of modern thought. Under the present title he reviews recent developments in psychology, sociology, history, ethics and metaphysics. The burden of his argument is the revolt of idealism, spiritualism, or volontarismo against the claims of nineteenth century positivism, t.e., natural science, to be the mould and measure and philosophy of the doc- trines, principles and history of mind, character, human ideas as such, and to impose its atomic, quantitative estimates on knowledge which is essentially qualitative, made up of subjective values and not predicable by scientific causation. We see the tables turned once more, and intro- spection, which has gone cowering under the taunt of lack of objec- tive validity, rearing a proud crest, conscious of its intimacy with all of knowledge that is immediate, direct, certain. To it, to borrow Prof. Ward's recent utterance, belong facts, to science fictions.
