126 PHILOSOPHICAL PEEIODICALS. Psychology of Values.' [Appreciation without description and descrip- tion without appreciation are but abstractions and ideal limits. Hence the part to be played by appreciative differences in scientific reconstruc- tion becomes a practical question. Now the psychology of the value- consciousness seeks to interpret. This means that a non-appreciative introspective analysis, while it may be used as an objective instrument of control, can never be taken as reality. The realities are the feeling- continuities with meaning, which are functional categories ; and functional analysis is simply the refinement of appreciative description.] J. A. Lcighton. ' The Psychological Self and the Actual Personality.' [Suggests a method of considering the self which, as emphasising the historical factor in personality, may be called ' metahistorical,' and in opposition to the psychological may be called ' noological '.] B. H. Bode. ' The Concept of Pure Experience.' [Critique of Dewey. "From the fact that an erroneous doctrine of sensation and thought hems us in to the narrow circle of our own impressions, it surely does not follow that all reference or self-transcendence is to be interpreted in terms of present functional value within the experience of the individual."] Discussion. G-. H. Sabine. ' Radical Empiricism as a Logical Method.' [Critique of James. The essential weakness of the position is that it attempts to develop a logic and metaphysics from a point of view which entitles it only to a psychology.] Reviews of Books. Notices of New Books. Summaries of Articles. Notes. PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW. Vol. xii., No. 4. T. H. Haines. ' The Synthetic Factor in Tactual Space Perception.' [Describes experiments undertaken with the view of restoring the tactual image (or some vaguer and more primitive tactual cue) to its spatial rights as against an undue emphasis of visualisation.] F. Arnold. ' Consciousness and Its Object.' [Neither by introspection nor by any hypothesis of a consciousness aware of its own flow can we have any mental state in which consciousness does not have an object, and that in the present. We do not build up the world from sensations ; rather we build up a system of sensations, etc., from the world, by abstraction from the objects before us.] R. H. Stetson. ' A Motor Theory of Rhythm and Discrete Succession. i.' Vol. xii., No. 5. M. L. Nelson. 'The Difference between Men and Women in the Recognition of Colour and the Perception of Sound.' [Men are superior in the recognition of blue ; women possibly superior in the recognition of yellow (spectral bands). Men hear farther than women ; the right ear in both sexes is keener than the left (fork tones).] K. Dunlap. ' Extensity and Pitch.' [Pitch differences are directly com- parable to the differences in planar or linear extent ; and their physio- logical condition is probably difference in the number of nerve-endings stimulated.] R. H. Stetson. ' A Motor Theory of Rhythm and Discrete Succession. II.' [Describes experiments with up-and-down movements of a baton, and with tapping by finger and foot, made in the interests of a detailed motor theory of rhythm. Rhythms are single (ticking, bird song, verse, prose, walking) or combined, concomitant (music, dancing). (1) Analysis of the movement-cycle of a single rhythm leads to a study of the ballistic stroke, of the unit-group (" the form in which the various muscle- sets and segments of a limb or organ can all work together freely and easily in a single-movement cycle "), of perceived as compared with produced rhythms, of verse and prose rhj^thm, etc. (2) The study of combined rhythms, whose field is music, begins with the measure, and goes on to deal with such problems as the effect of change of tempo on rhythmical character. The author ends by discussing, in terms of Miinsterberg's action theory, the central processes of rhythm and of
