PHILOSOPHICAL PEEIODICALS. 133 which, consequently, may not be regarded as wholly reducible to con- scious factors, but has its very roots in our inmost self, or, as the author calls it, in the unconscious.] Draghicesco. 'De la possibility des sciences sociales.' [The immense series of centuries which were neces- sary to the establishment of immutable cosmic laws and to the full evolution of life on our planet, compared with the very short time elapsed since the constitution of human societies, forces on us, according to M. Draghicesco, the conclusion that we are still, in so far as these are concerned, at an epoch of chaos and anomy. At the present day the sociological laws are only on their way towards existence ; to try, there- fore, to discover now, through observation, sociological laws comparable to the laws of nature, is a waste of time. In a very remote future, when the knowledge of nature will be completed and the integration of societies into a unique planetary society fully accomplished, then, and only then, there shall emerge in full completion, along with the perfect social life, the object of the psycho- social sciences. A brief sketch of the main phases of this final social harmony ends the article.] J. N. Matienzo. 'La logique comme science objective.' [A short and valu- able defence of the general conception of logic elaborated by Mill, Bain, Morgan, Boole, Spencer, Stanley-Jevons and Dr. Venn. The scholastic conception of logic should be abandoned as anthropocentrie and in- adequate ; its function should be not to study the intellectual operations, but the universal objective relations we know through those operations, to investigate the supreme conditions to which the truths discovered by the special sciences are subjected.] Revue Critique: F. Paulhan. ' L'Idealisme d'aujourd'hui.' [An interesting account and critical exami- nation of two recent books : Brunschvicg's L'Idealisme contemporain and Villa's L'Idealismo modcrno.] Analyses et comptes rendus. Eevue des Periodiques etrangers. No. 11. Novembre, 1905. G. Richard. 'Les lois de la solidarite morale.' [The main conclusions of this important article may be summed up thus : Social man alone is able to conceive the idea of moral value. This idea implies that of solidarity. The individual cannot assign a moral value to any of his acts or to the whole of his conduct, if he does not consider its relation to the possible social evil, without any regard to his personal happiness. Accordingly, the notion of moral value rests on the consciousness of social evil. Conduct has a value so much the greater as it attests a greater effort to react against the known causes of evil. But morality should not be identified, as it is in the positivist conception, with a purely automatic sociality : there is no moral value where there is no difficulty to overcome. The automatic and instinctive tendencies which arise unconsciously out of life in society must needs lead to the irremediable abasement of the collective character and even to its dissolution.] L. Dugas. ' Sur les abstracts emotionnels.' [M. Bibot has called emotional abstracts some general ideas which have not their origin in a fusion of particular images, but result from their being grouped about a privileged sentiment. M. Dugas holds that most of our general ideas have no other origin. Refuting Gallon's theory and analysing the laws of sentiments, he concludes that they are a principle of abstraction and are themselves able to be abstracted and generalised. Affective abstraction is not derived from the abstraction in representa- tions ; on the contrary, the former is the principle of the latter.] P. G-aultier. ' La moralite de 1'art.' [Art in itself is neither moral nor immoral ; it is amoral, that is to say, distinct from morality. But art, provided it be not directed against morality, may be rightly considered as being an aid to morality. The sesthetic sentiment, besides harmonising wonderfully with the sentiments properly called moral, prepares and even incites us to morality through the analogies which exist between
