THE AMBIGUITY OF TEUTH. 165 Prof. Taylor wisely does not tell us how the clamorousness of a claim is going to establish its validity, but it is clear that his failure to observe the distinction demolishes his defini- tion of truth. It is evident moreover that not much can be expected from theories which have overlooked so vital a distinction. Their unawareness of it will vitiate all their discussions of the nature of ' truth,' by which they will mean now the one sense, now the other, and now both, in inextric- able fallacy. II. Our provisional analysis, therefore, has resulted in our detecting an important ambiguity in the conception of truth which, unless it can be cleared up, must hopelessly vitiate all discussion. In view of this distressing situation it be- comes our bounden duty to inquire how an accepted truth may be distinguished from a mere claim, and how a claim to truth may be validated. For any logic which aims at dealing with actual thinking the urgency of this inquiry can hardly be exaggerated. But even the most ' purely ' intellectual and futilely formal theory of knowledge can hardly refuse to undertake it. For the ambiguity which raises the problem is absolutely all-pervading. And, as we saw, a formal claim to truth is coextensive with the sphere of logical judgment. We are always liable, therefore, to misinterpret every judg- ment. We may take as a validated truth what in point of fact is really an unsupported claim. But inasmuch as such a claim may always be erroneous, we are constantly in danger of accepting as validly true what, if tested, would be utterly untenable. Every assertion is ambiguous, and as it shows no outward indication of what it really means, we can hardly be said to know the meaning of any assertion whatsoever. On any view of logic, the disastrous and demoralising con- sequences of such a situation may be imagined. It is im- perative therefore to distinguish sharply between the formal inclusion of a 'statement in the sphere of truth-or-falsity, and its incorporation into a system of tested truth. For unless we do so, we simply court deception. This possibility of deception, moreover, becomes the more serious when we realise how impotent our formal logic is as it applies, there is in my opinion no question. The question will be rather as to how far the Law applies and how far therefore it is true." The first proposition is either a truism or false. It is a truism if 'truth' is taken in the sense of ' claim ' ; for it then only states that a claim is good if the question of its application is waived. In any other sense of ' truth ' it is false (or rather self-contradictory), since it admits that there is a question about the application of the ' Law '. In the second pro- position it is implied that ' truth ' depends not on the mere claim, but on the possibility of application. 12
