174 F. c. s. SCHILLER: to point out the signal aid which pragmatism affords to a symmetrical classification of the sciences. If truth also is a valuation, we can understand why logic should be a nor- mative science along with ethics and aesthetics : if all the natural sciences make use of logical judgments and lay claim to logical values, we can understand also how and why the normative sciences have dominion over them. And lastly we find that the antithetical valuations and the distinction between claims and their selection into norms run through all the normative sciences in a perfectly analogous way. Just as not everything is true which claims truth, so not every- thing is good or right or beautiful which claims to be so, while ultimately all these claims are judged by their relation to the perfect harmony which forms our final aspiration. VI. I promised at the outset to conclude this paper with a twofold challenge, and now that I have set forth as well as I am able the advantages proffered by the pragmatic view of truth I will revert to this challenge, in a spirit not of contentiousness so much as of anxious inquiry. For I fear that a really resolute adherent of the intellectualist tradi- tion would be unmoved and unconvinced by anything I, or any one, could say. He would simply close his eyes and seal his ears, and recite his creed. And perhaps no man- yet was ever convinced of philosophic truth against his will. But there are beginning to be signs (and even wonders) that our intellectualism is growing less resolute. And so perhaps- even those who are not yet willing to face the new solutions can be brought to see the gaps in the old. If therefore we bring these to their notice very humbly, but very persis- tently, we may enable them to see that the old intellectu- alism has left its victims unprovided with answers to two very momentous questions. Let us ask, therefore, how, upon its assumptions, they propose (1) to evaluate a claim to truth, and (2) to discriminate between such a claim and an established truth ? These two questions constitute the first part of my challenge. They are, I think, good ques- tions, and such that from any theory of knowledge with pretensions to completeness an answer may fairly be de- manded. And if such an answer exists, it is so vital to the whole case of intellectualism that it may fairly be required to produce it. If it is not produced, we will be patient, and hope that some day we may be vouchsafed a revelation of esoteric truth ; but human nature is weak and the longer the delay the stronger will grow the suspicion that there is nothing to produce. The second part of my challenge refers to the intellectu-
