VIII. PHILOSOPHICAL PEKIODICALS. PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. Vol. xv., No. 1. W. Fite. ' The Experience- Philosophy.' [The fundamental proposition of the experience-philosophy (that experience and it alone is ' given ' or ' immediately given ') is its fundamental error : the thing in space and time is as good a datum as experience : neither is an absolute datum ; and the search for absolute data is illusory and logically unnecessary.] Q. H. Sabine. ' Hume's Contribution to the Historical Method.' [Any theory tending to the recognition of the intimacy of the social relation is also indirectly a contribution to the growth of the historical method. Here Hume's merit is unmistakable : his view of the social nature of the individual and of the organic structure of society is far more adequate than that of the bulk of his contemporaries. His direct contribution is, naturally, less clear ; though he did good service by directing attention, in his History, chiefly toward manners and customs.] W. B. Pitkin. ' The Self-Transcendency of Knowledge.' [A plea for differentiation of terms. The self-transcendency of knowledge is used at present to mean the onflowing of experience towards an unknown ; the experiencing of things not ' here,' i.e., temporally or spatially remote ; the non-deducible char- acter of the order and way in which new contents appear ; the excess of meaning over process ; the representative or symbolical function of experience ; the superiority of concept to percept.] Discussion. A. C. Armstrong. ' Herder and Fiske on the Prolongation of Infancy.' [Herder anticipated Fiske ; but there is no evidence of conscious derivation or even of unrealised indebtedness.] Reviews of Books. Notices of New Books. Summaries of Articles. Notes. Vol. xv., No. 2. J. Dewey. ' Beliefs and Realities.' [The writer first outlines the con- ception of the ' common man,' that beliefs are real, and manifest their reality in the usual way, by modifying and shaping the reality of other real things. He then sketches the history of thought, showing how beliefs have been subjected to preconceived notions of knowledge and of reality as its monopolistic possession. Thirdly, he traces some of the motifs which make for reconsideration of the supposed uniquely exclusive relation of logical knowledge and reality. Finally, he seeks to prove that the pragmatic point of view unites the fullest acknowledgment of moral powers and demands with thoroughgoing naturalism.] F. Thilly. ' Psychology, Natural Science, and Philosophy.' [Rejects various argu- ments in favour of making psychology a natural science : that mind may be studied in connexion with matter, that the mental series of itself does not form a continuous line, that psychology employs scientific arguments. On the other hand, psychology is indispensable to philosophical studies, while there is no absolutely presuppositionless psychology.] H. H. Bawden. ' Evolution and the Absolute.' [The ideas of unity (conser- vation) and continuity (evolution) are true only when each is interpreted in terms of the other. Reality or experience is conceived as absolutely conserved or as an evolution in time according to the demands of the
