This distinction of subjective and objective aspects must not be confused with the very different distinction between self and not-self.[1] As character or immediacy is a universal aspect of everything experienced, the self and its constituents cannot be experienced more immediately than the not-self. The environment is not given to the self. The ego does not find objects before it.[2] The self as well as the not-self is located in space. They are equally objective, and must be apprehended in exactly the same manner as spatially related within the unity of objective experience. The self differs from other contents in space only through its greater richness and manifoldness, especially as regards the interrelations of its thoughts. Though the self is in the same space with its environment, thoughts which have outlived the environment which they previously constituted form one whole with it, and so stand in highly complex spatial and temporal relations to one another and to the environment which is present here and now. These thoughts, however, as has already been pointed out, have the objectivity that belongs to every content, and are therefore experienced in the same manner as any sensible object in space. Everything in the self, and accordingly the self as a whole, is experienced as having the same kind of existence as its spatial environment. Here again, therefore, as in the distinction between characters and contents, there is duality but no dualism. While the opposition of characters and contents is a distinction between aspects inseparably involved in every single experience, the opposition of self and not-self is a distinction of kindred groups of concrete contents within the field of objective experience. Avenarius’ view of the self is obviously determined by the same naturalistic intention as that of Hume. But while Hume contends that we can know nothing of the ultimate nature of the self, Avenarius seeks to prove that there is nothing in the self which cannot be known by a possible extension of our present experience.
The brain is experienced as independent in the same sense as “material” bodies.[3] Everything, in fact, which is not character is experienced as permanent existence. Avenarius therefore contrasts the dependent characters with the independent vibrations of the nervous system. The characters
- ↑ Cf. Der Menschliche Weltbegriff, § 138 ff.
- ↑ Cf. Der Menschliche Weltbegriff, § 143 ff.; Vierteljahrsschrift, vol. xviii., “Bemerkungen,” pp. 145-146, § 22 ff.; pp. 151-152, §§ 40-41; p. 406, § 81.
- ↑ The brain can itself be brought within the experienced field by opening the skull and making a suitable arrangement of mirrors. Cf. Der Menschliche Weltbegriff, § 129.
