VI. CEITICAL NOTICES. Studies in the Philosophy of Religion. By GEOBGE GALLOWAY, B.D., formerly Examiner in Philosophy in the University of St. Andrews. Edinburgh and London : Blackwood & Sons, 1904. Pp. 328. THIS work, reviewed thus late solely by the fault of the present writer, undoubtedly forms one of the most substantial and reward- ing contributions to Religious Philosophy which this country has produced in recent years. It does not pretend to cover the whole field, and the author cautions us against supposing that it was his purpose, more Germanico, to deal with the subject systematically. Yet we know that essays have stimulating qualities of their own ; and while the six essays comprised in the present volume do not amount to a system of Beligionsphilosophie, they are consistent with one another, and would find their place in a system. The book is uniformly characterised by lucid, massive, competent think- ing, and it is unusually well-informed. Mr. Galloway's mind is of the synoptic order, and the broad and exact learning he commands has enabled him to impart to his ultimate conclusions a credibility and impressiveness which do not always belong to the general views of the philosopher. The clear, steady movement of ratiocina- tion by which the argument at each stage is unfolded, and the writer's gift of keeping rigorously, though without pedantry, to the matter in hand, make what he has to say instructive in a very high degree. One improvement in form a very slight one I venture to suggest, is that each essay should have prefixed to it a brief synopsis of its contents, as is done in the recent collection entitled Personal Idealism. Mr. Galloway is notably strong on the side of psychology and history ; but he is also possessed of a gift for metaphysical thinking, and as a philosopher is perhaps best described as belonging to the school of Lotze. Like his master, he is on his guard at every point against one-sided views. He is not a Utilitarian ; but he finds that the rigid exclusion of results from the valuation of conduct is not possible. He concedes that judgments of value play an im- portant part in religious cognition ; he denies that theology, as a science, can be reared on this basis. He is not a Hegelian, for he holds that Hegel gave no adequate psychological analysis of the religious consciousness ; but neither is he a Voluntarist, for he re-
