410 CRITICAL NOTICES : bullying his little brother, in the hope of improving his character. The act is good because the motive is good, but whether or no the deed is good depends on whether it produces the effect desired. If the boy is merely hardened in his vicious tendency the deed was ill-judged and so far bad. This chapter is marred by the author's rejection of the important distinction between intention and motive, he maintaining that the motive is merely a more remote intention. Though the distinction is commonly not clearly conceived, yet it is valid and important, as in fact the author explicitly admits in a later chapter (p. 139) when he describes actions intended but not motived. Surely the distinction is that motive refers always to some change to be pro- duced in the mind of self or other, while intention refers only to the physical changes by means of which these changes are to be effected. In the case of the father preparing to punish his child, the intention is to beat him, the motive is to make him repent ; or to take the illustration chosen by the author I prepare to drive through Baling to Oxford. He says my intention is to drive through Ealing, my motive is to reach Oxford. Surely my intention is to reach Oxford and my motive is the enjoyment of the sights or the society I shall find there. It is not until we recognise clearly both these distinctions, that between act and deed, and that between intention and motive, that moral judgments can be satisfactorily passed. We have to pass judgment not merely on motive, on intention, on will, but upon the accomplished deed. The motive must be good, the deed intended must be well calculated to satisfy the motive, the action must be efficiently directed to the accomplishment of the intended deed, and the will must be strong enough to carry through the action, or, in short, in distributing praise or blame we ought to, as in practice we usually do, take into consideration efficiency in realising ends as well as the quality of the ends themselves. In chapter iii. wrong-doing is defined as the doing harm to another intentionally. And then the author finds himself compelled to recognise the importance of the distinc- tion between motive and intention which in the previous chapter he has rejected, for he rightly admits that the infliction of harm intentionally from a good motive does not necessarily incur re- sponsibility. The definition must therefore be completed by adding to it the words from motives which are not good. In chapter iv. the nature of insanity is sketched in clear and firm outlines. The most important contention is that insanity is never a partial disease, that we must assume that in all cases "the whole maa is a changed being," that "his personality is altered ". The symptoms are disorders of conduct, of bodily func- tion and of mind. Disorder of each class is present in every case of insanity, but in some cases disorders of one of these classes, in others disorders of another class are the most prominent symptoms. Disorders of conduct are the most important symptoms and " it is the elaborate acts that are affected first and most, that are lost
