NEW SERIES. No. 60.] [OCTOBER, 1906. MIND A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY I. ON FLOATING IDEAS AND THE IMAGINARY. BY F. H. BRADLEY. IN this paper l I shall attempt to deal briefly with several subjects or perhaps aspects of one subject. My aim through- out is to advocate the same main conclusion, but no satis- factory treatment of the questions opened is possible within these limits. The first discussion will be about the existence of floating ideas, the next will examine the difference in con- tent between the 'real' and the 'imaginary/ and the third will inquire as to the relation between imagination and play, together with the distinction between play and earnest. The conclusion to be urged or suggested in each case is that a hard division between the real and the imaginary is not tenable. The true nature and criterion of reality must hence be sought and found elsewhere. I. I will take first the question as to floating ideas. This should be preceded by a discussion of the nature of ideas in general, but such an inquiry is obviously not possible here. I must content myself here with referring to the conclusion which I have advocated elsewhere. 2 Every idea 3 essentially qualifies reality, but no idea on the other hand does this simply and bodily. Every idea has its own existence as 1 The first two divisions of this article may be taken as a commentary on various parts of my book Appearance and Reality. See especially pp. 3G6 foil. In Appearance (see the Index) and in various articles in MIND (0. S., No. 49, p. 23 ; N. S., No. 40, pp. 5, 6 ; No. 41, p. 17, and No. 44, pp. 27, 28) 3 This holds even of the idea of ' nothing '. See below p. 455 30
