ON FLOATING IDEAS AND THE IMAGINARY. 453 subject of this judgment is never the actual fact. (2) On the other hand the actual fact to some extent enters into the judgment. And (3) in many cases the judgment contains an unavowed implication. It more or less covertly implies, that is, a certain connexion between its subject and the actual fact. (1) In every hypothetical judgment there is actual fact to which the subject is opposed. This actual fact may be a perceived existence, or again it may belong to some ideal or imaginary world. But in every case the use of " if " marks a distinction between what we think and what is otherwise real. If a square could be round then something follows, which does not follow from an actual square. And ' if you attacked that man he would defend himself ' does not make its assertion about that man. The man is not attacked, the square is not round, and you do not even suggest that either is so. And in ' if he goes there he will succeed ' you do not say that he will go there. From him, as you know him, that pre- dicate is absent, and your ' if ' means that you are not speaking of the known actual man. In every case you are speaking of that which you suppose, and whatever you suppose you ipso facto oppose to what you take to be real. Otherwise there would be no sense in supposing and no meaning in 'if. (2) On the other side your assertion clearly in some sense refers to the actual fact. For otherwise, and if there were no connexion, who could think of supposing ? If your as- sertion had positively or negatively nothing to do with your actual reality, it would be meaningless or at least must lose its hypothetical form. Thus on the one side you are dealing in some sense with actual fact. The subject of your judgment on the other hand is not an actual fact. But the actual fact is referred to and to some extent it enters into the subject of the judgment. We have first the actual man who is not attacked and who is not the subject, and we have next the supposed, the ideal, man of whom the judgment is I true. If these two men are the same, our ' if ' at least im- plies that we do not know this, while on the other side our ' if ' implies that these men are connected. There is in short enough known identity between the two men to warrant a supposition. We thus assert about the ideal man but also refer to the other man. Our reference assumes that certainly between the two there is a partial identity, while our supposi- tion means that, for anything we really know, there is a difference which on the whole is superior and prevails. 1 1 A. hypothetical judgment (to state this otherwise) is itself always universal, but it implies that there is a question of bringing a designated case under this universal judgment. It implies that this question is
